Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-94-175 *9 September 1994*

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Ethnic Greeks Given Less Than Minimum Sentence

AU0909072594 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 8 Sep 94

[Text] Greece has launched an unacceptable wave of threats following the court's verdict against five Albanian citizens of Greek nationality. Meanwhile, all the newspapers published today stress that the defendants received sentences below the minimum defined by law. The following report was prepared by correspondent Arben Karapici:

[Karapici] The Tirana Court verdict that was announced at the end of the trial of five Albanian defendants of Greek origin testified to their complete guilt, which is beyond all doubt. Not being at all political, the verdict announced by an open court in conformity with justice regulations badly discredited the Greek state and the hotheaded policy that official Athens is pursuing against Albania. As it was discredited so badly, our southern neighbor raised, and continues to raise, a storm of primitive revenge, which is unacceptable not only to the new Albanian law-governed state, but also to integrated Europe and the consolidated democracies on the old continent.

A short-lived policy with no good perspective—this is the current policy that Greece intends to pursue against Albania on the absurd pretext of the trial that has just ended. Too bad if our southern neighbor follows such a policy—it will feel like losing twice. The current policy, as RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE writes, cannot be pursued with the sword of Achilles [symbolic of revenge], which can only be found in a museum in Athens. In this framework, the newspaper points out that membership in the European Union does not mean that Greece can take up the Achilles sword. EU membership does not at all mean that Greece can act on the spur of surpassed chauvinist Hellenic appetites.

Meanwhile, the Republican Party newspaper asks whether it is time to ask Greece: Will those convicted yesterday be the last? Albania forgave Greece, REPUBLIKA concludes, stressing that the old age of the defendants and the Greek state itself was considered a mitigating circumstance.

Meanwhile, all the newspapers published today stress that the Albanian defendants of Greek origin were given sentences below the minimum defined by law.

Refugees Deported From Greece Total 48,366

AU0809194494 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 8 Sep 94

[Text] Public Order Ministry Spokesman Ludmilla Pajo reports that the total number of emigrants deported from Greece so far totals 48,366.

As of 1915 hours today, 1,791 persons have been deported via three border crossing points: 1,015 deported from Kapshtice, 725 from Kakavije, and 33 via Sarande, 19 of whom had passports with valid visas.

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Reaction to, Commentary on Cabinet Crisis

SP Leader Interviewed

AU0809133694 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 5 Sep 94 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Zhan Videnov, Bulgarian Socialist Party (SP) leader, by Dora Kostadinova; place and date not given: "New Vote Is Only Remedy Against Demagogy"]

[Text] [Kostadinova] Is there a link between the cabinet's resignation, the murder of Tsvetan Tsvetanov, the tension in the Army, and the illogical rise of the dollar during a "dead" season?

[Videnov] The cabinet's resignation was undoubtedly brought on by the complex situation in the country and its serious problems. I mean the beginning of mass privatization, the land reform, payments on the foreign debt, and the necessity of adopting a new social and investment policy. The cabinet correctly assessed that a new political formation, created in the most responsible way—by the people—is needed to implement this. By resigning it gave that possibility a chance.

[Kostadinova] Which of the four variants that Professor Berov listed in his radio address leads most directly toward this goal?

[Videnov] Prof. Berov repeatedly pointed out that new elections are necessary. I fully share his view that the time has come to engage the voters, the most responsible political forces, and the most serious ideas in working out alternatives for the transition period. Theoretically, this could happen without elections, but in reality, all other possibilities have been exhausted, and the results were not very satisfactory. Those who today are calling most loudly for national consensus, political responsibility, and statesman's wisdom bear the greatest blame for this. Demagogy has never helped Bulgaria, and it continues to harm it. The only remedy against it is a new vote by the people.

[Kostadinova] Does the cabinet's resignation clear the way for new elections?

[Videnov] Yes, the resignation of Prof. Berov's cabinet is a very important step toward early elections. The resignation must be adopted by the National Assembly, and from that point on work will be focused on organizing the elections rather than preventing them.

[Kostadinova] However, according to certain calculations no more than 80 National Assembly members actually want elections....

[Videnov] Then the other 160 will have to agree with them. The real situation in the country and political logic call for new elections. Preventing the elections would create a great danger for our constitutionalism. A government formed and supported by people who are trying to save themselves from political death has no chance of ruling successfully, and it would readily use violence to remain in power. The same applies to a caretaker government with a two-month mandate. It would clearly be an anticonstitutional and usurping government. The Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] categorically opposes such variants. Every responsible politician, statesman, and citizen would do the same. Therefore I do not think that preventing new elections is a plausible alternative.

[Kostadinova] In May the scarecrows "Tatarchev" and "presidential dictatorship" were the main arguments the BSP parliamentary faction used against new elections. Now one could add to this the fact that no new bill on the Supreme Judicial Council was adopted. The same applies to the defense bill. There is real mass privatization and no new election bill. The Constitution has not been amended in order to dispel the fears related to forming a caretaker cabinet.... Do you expect the debate in the BSP between those who support new elections and those who oppose to resume?

[Videnov] This dispute was resolved at the congress in favor of early elections in the fall of 1994. During the summer session of parliament the Parliamentary Alliance for Social Democracy succeeded in eliminating many of the perils you mentioned. The rest could be done much better in the future parliament. Therefore at the end of July the BSP Supreme Council and deputies stressed only three urgent tasks—amending the Constitution, adopting the election bill, and creating a political partnership on the basis of strong and convincing election platforms. If at least a part of the willingness shown by the political forces for new elections is implemented, those goals will be achieved. The most important factor, however, is the political will to change things—something the BSP will demonstrate. This is a clear logic that eliminates all dispute.

[Kostadinova] Do you not underestimate certain new threats? After the recent changes in the Army the people are speaking about a state of emergency, presidential dictatorship, and even a military coup.

[Videnov] I do not see such a threat. I am sure that some people entertain such thoughts. However, everyone understands what the reaction of our citizens and foreign public opinion would be. The problem is different. The recent personnel changes in the Army are related to a fundamental dispute that has been going on for years. It cannot be resolved without a certain amount of national consensus regarding military policy and the legal, financial, technical, and personnel support of the military. In this realm the institutions rather than the parties should play the major role, but they are doing nothing. This especially applies to the commander in chief, President Zhelyu Zhelev. In such a grave situation the military experts, including the former and current heads of the General Staff, are doing the only possible thing—they are trying to preserve the Army's combat ability, by preserving its best commanders. Fake military strategists such as the former defense minister, Ludzhev, and the outgoing defense minister, Aleksandrov, "reform" the

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Army by reshuffling cadres and structures, pretend that they are absent minded and do not remember that it is necessary to adopt certain bills, and that the means are insufficient and the equipment—obsolete. The Army is not and will not be a threat to the civil peace but it itself is jeopardized by serious problems, which the Berov cabinet tried to resolve in the wrong way. In its election platform the BSP will pay great attention to this issue in the hope that the next cabinet established by the new parliament will be able to cope with it more easily.

DP Leader Interviewed

AU0809115894 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 5 Sep 94 p 10

[Interview with Democratic Party (DP) leader Stefan Savov by Tikhomir Sholev and other unidentified correspondents at Sofia airport on 4 September: "Savov Would Head Rightist Cabinet"]

[Text] [24 CHASA] Were you surprised to hear, when you were in Germany, that the cabinet had resigned?

[Savov] Yes, I was surprised, like everyone else.

[24 CHASA] How was the resignation reported in Germany?

[Savov] Only one of the major dailies reported the resignation in six lines. That is the interest our country generates in Germany.

[24 CHASA] What do you think prompted the resignation?

[Savov] The resignation had been in the air for some time, but I think that the conflict between the defense minister and the chief of the General Staff played a major role.

[24 CHASA] What are the alternatives now? Do you think the resignation will be accepted?

[Savov] I think it should be accepted. The Constitution, which is not very precise on this matter, stipulates that the parliament is to accept the resignation of the cabinet. This means that it holds something similar to a confidence vote or a non- confidence vote. There is a big difference between the two. For a confidence vote, the cabinet needs a regular majority, which is one- half of the attending parliament members, while for a nonconfidence vote, a majority of at least 121 deputies is needed. It is very difficult to forecast how the vote will go. You must ask each of the 238 deputies.

[24 CHASA] Do you think a new cabinet should be formed?

[Savov] I have always been a pessimist concerning the formation of a leftist or noncommunist cabinet. I do not think there are enough votes for each of the two variants. However, in politics, two and two do not necessarily make four, but rather five, eight, or 20. Thus, I cannot predict anything.

[24 CHASA] Will you participate in the talks regarding the formation of a new cabinet?

[Savov] I must because I am the leader of a parliamentary faction and chairman of a party that has a significant number of deputies. However, this does not mean that I will participate in the negotiations on forming a new cabinet.

[24 CHASA] What will you do if you are offered the post of prime minister? Observers say you could form a predominantly blue [Union of Democratic Forces] cabinet.

[Savov] I had heard that in Munich, but I am hardly the man who would undertake this job. I am not optimistic regarding the chances of such a cabinet to resolve the situation.

[24 CHASA] Would you predict new elections?

[Savov] I said that there will first be a confidence vote. In Munich, I read the summaries that are sent to our consular offices abroad and learned that Palchev [deputy of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, DPS] stated that the DPS will support Berov's cabinet. I am not sure how the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] will vote because the BSP does not consist of just Zhan Videnov. You know that, in this party, there also are people who think in a different manner.

[24 CHASA] What is the lesser evil—a new cabinet or new elections?

[Savov] I keep thinking about it. The new elections variant exists. I deeply believe that the communist totalitarian system must finally be destroyed and eliminated. However, I am concerned about the possibility of a victory or, unfortunately, even a great victory, of the former communists.

There is only one thing I can tell you with great certainty: In the last five years in which I have actively participated in politics, I have never been in such a situation as now, where I am facing so many uncertainties and questions as to what must be done. I do not think that any Bulgarian politician could clearly answer this question. There are a lot of problems.

[24 CHASA] Mr. Savov, would you head a rightist cabinet?

[Savov] Yes, by all means I would head a rightist cabinet after the elections.

[24 CHASA] Is a rightist cabinet possible in this parliament?

[Savov] No. As I said, it is almost impossible to form a rightist or leftist cabinet in this parliament.

[24 CHASA] It is difficult to form a cabinet and the BSP will win the elections. Then what is your choice?

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[Savov] The choice is very difficult. I do not fear for the politicians, I fear for Bulgaria.

[24 CHASA] Will the Democratic Party sign the SDS political agreement?

[Savov] We are meeting on 5 September. I do not like to talk on my behalf and prefer to express the opinion of the Central Bureau or the Supreme Party Council. However, it somehow does not seem appropriate to sign an agreement when we are suspended.

[24 CHASA] Would not signing help Mr. Dimitrov easily expel you?

[Savov] Of course. But tell me, how could I sign when Filip Dimitrov and his friends are trying to establish an alternative Democratic Party with people we do not know or people we have expelled?

[24 CHASA] Could you appear independently in the elections?

[Savov] Of course.

Political Dilemmas Viewed

AU0909081394 Sofia NOVINI 5 in Bulgarian 31 Aug 94 p 9

[Article by Tsvyatko Lambrev: "Krustuy's Dilemma"]

[Text] A hot and confusing political autumn that is likely to confront our country with new dilemmas should be expected. The past and present confrontation of the major political forces and the impotence and confusion of the state institutions caused a stagnation in the transition period and halted the reforms. It is ruining the state and exacerbating the crisis. Our society is ripe for a change. It is ripe for a new policy, a new parliament, for a strong, new executive power. The question is whether anyone capable of implementing this task exists, and how he could achieve the objective. The simple answer is—through early elections. However, in order to attain this goal, our country's political leaders should, once and for all, assume their responsibility toward the nation, overcome their personal, political ambitions and economic interests, and accept personal sacrifice for the sake of a victory in the service of public interests.

Phony heroes who are allegedly ready to assume this role exist in abundance. They are appearing on the scene whenever the crisis escalates and the disappointed electorate is eager to hear some new solemn promises, but they immediately disappear behind the stage whenever they are required to do some real work and when deeds are supposed to prevail over too many words.

One of the most cunning and flexible phony representatives of the transition period is Krustyu Petkov [leader of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria, KNSB]. His recently increased activity indicates that something is going to happen and that the time for purchasing some profitable shares on the political stock market has come. Let us hear some of the things that the professor, trade union leader, and millionaire solemnly declared over the last 10 days or so:

—He declared that he is preparing a new national strike against the new price increase and the deterioration of the living standard expected for October and November 1994, which have been called for to provoke trade union protests. The purpose of all this is to overthrow the Berov government, through which Lukanov [former prime minister, present deputy] is ruling the country behind the scenes, while Krustyu Petkov is expected to earn credit for it.

—He declared that the KNSB is going to advocate a boycott of early elections, because holding them in 1994 is not likely to bring any change. (In May 1994 and even until a month ago, the professor was preaching exactly the opposite, at the time of the so-called "general strike").

—He declared that the KNSB would not accept the formation of a new government according to Deputy Georgi Markov's formula, namely by the signing of a political agreement on a Fatherland Front basis consisting of non-communist forces and coordinated with the trade unions and the president. The agreement in question would draft a new program and form a new government consisting of the Parliamentary Group of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] (eliminating Filip Dimitrov's SDS and his leadership of the 134 Rakovski Street headquarters). According to Markov's idea, this kind of government should appoint new oblast administrators, amend the Electoral Law at its own convenience, decide on the pre-election status of the media, determine who should be granted the license for a private, national TV channel, and so forth. (The only thing that is missing from this program is the reorganization of the army, the police, and the Diplomatic Service, so that everything is clear?!). Under such circumstances, the new SDS Fatherland Front headed by Georgi Markov and U.S. Ambassador Montgomery, and perhaps by Zhelyu Zhelev, to a certain extent, is likely to win the elections by a narrow margin, but for eternity. This is even too much for Krustyu Petkov's taste, hence he said no to the agreement!

—Petkov declared that he accepts the idea of another government within the framework of the current parliament. (Is this not a triple U-turn, typical of Krustyu Petkov?) A few days earlier he described the option of a transitional government as a cabinet of a few minor parties and outcasts that is hardly likely to do better than Berov and his team. Perhaps, he is aiming at a government of national responsibility and consensus, a government composed of trade union experts? It is not clear who should support it. Or does Prof. Petkov see the balance of such a government in the principle of diverging interests? Or does he perhaps have the more subtle idea of exhausting the political and electoral potentials of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP],

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of the SDS, and of the Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS] at the same time, to make the bipolar model collapse so that the social liberal idea of the great democratic alternative embodied by the Zhelev-Krustyu Petkov duo may rise?

Pretending to be deeply concerned about the Bulgarian people's wellbeing, Prof. Petkov started his autumn political-trade union campaign that resulted in Petkov's letter to the BSP and DPS criticizing Berov and the two aforementioned parties as well. We may expect a further circular letter addressed to all political forces and to the president proposing a new government according to Krustyu Petkov's model.

I am amazed at the attitude of the major political forces! Why do they hesitate from resolve Krustuy's dilemma? Let them agree to put him at the head of a new government, while they assume trade union positions in parliament for a change. This will show at last whether the professor is something more than a phony politician who (at other people's expense) is waiting for his time to come. This is likely to make people understand that a trade union leader cannot pretend to his electorate that he is embarking upon a straightforward left-wing path, while, in the meantime, he is turning his head from the left to right constantly in order to focus on the president's center crossroad in the long run.

Narcotics Chief Comments on Illegal Production

AU0809170894 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 2 Sep 94 p 3

[Interview with Rositsa Ivanova, chief of the National Narcotics Service, by Nedelina Aneva; place and date not given: "All Pharmaceutical Plants Used To Produce Drugs Illegally"]

[Text] [Aneva] Six kilograms of narcotics, produced by Troyafarm at someone's order, were seized in Troyan last week. Does anyone control the producers?

[Ivanova] I cannot guarantee an efficient control because there are no regional structures. When the organs of the Internal Affairs Ministry discovered the violation, I was in the middle of inspecting all activities at Troyafarm. The two inspections coincided, and I even utilized the TsSBOP [expansion unknown] transportation.

[Aneva] Was your inspection prompted by tipoffs or by suspicion?

[Ivanova] I inspected the pharmaceutical plants in Dupnitsa and Sofarma in Sofia, but I had never inspected Troyafarm. I had certain suspicions regarding the use of dionin. They need great quantities, but it appeared that they did not have the contracts for millions as they declared. Through documents, we also discovered the existence of a narcotics warehouse near Troyafarm.

[Aneva] What other plants do you suspect?

[Ivanova] This is the first case of drugs being produced at someone's order that I have learned about, but, in principle, in recent years we discovered the illegal production of drugs in all plants.

[Aneva] Is this an uncontrollable process, and what are the countermeasures you have adopted?

[Ivanova] First of all, the service's structures must be expanded. We have talked about this for years. Only I am working in the service right now. Experts at the regional level are needed.

There are no such experts at the plants in the provinces. There are warehouses, but they are extremely insufficient.

[Aneva] Are the service's unclear status and the low number of experts a deliberate phenomenon?

[Ivanova] I became convinced that the matter cannot be reduced to payroll jobs because new people are constantly being appointed at NILS [expansion unknown]. The concept regarding the service has been transferred from one file to another for three years now. All possible institutions of the executive and legislative powers and the president have been acquainted with it. I cannot accept the fact that there has been no reply as an accidental development.

[Aneva] Do you have any ideas as to whom is directing all this?

[Ivanova] It is people who definitely have an economic interest. The control does not suit their interests. Now they are utilizing the existing chaos in order to promote their business.

[Aneva] The granting of licenses to the companies begins on 1 September. Why are the distributors of drugs and opiates in such a hurry to obtain licenses?

[Ivanova] All the companies are in a hurry. There is no separate procedure for granting licenses to the drug producers and distributors in our country, despite the fact that, according to the international convention, this is necessary. The companies are in a hurry because the more gaps there are in the legislation, the better it is for them.

[Aneva] You have been in the service three years. Do you now have an idea exactly how dirty money is being laundered?

[Ivanova] I do not have any observations regarding my sphere.

[Aneva] Is it possible to launder money through licensing?

[Ivanova] Licensing creates the conditions for the flow of legal narcotics toward illegal factors.

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Ruml on Importance of Accords With Germany

LD0809122194 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 8 Sep 94

[Excerpts] Czech Interior Minister Jan Ruml and his German counterpart Manfred Kanther agreed in Berlin today to sign five important agreements between the Czech Republic and Germany. Our correspondent in Germany Jiri Halousek has more details:

[Halousek] [Passage omitted] After the meeting, when Jan Ruml arrived at the Reichstag in Berlin, where he is attending a meeting of interior and justice ministers from 22 European countries on combating organized crime, I asked him about the outcome of his talks with his German counterpart. This was Jan Ruml's answer:

[Begin recording] The main thing Minister Kanther and I agreed upon was that all of the agreements guaranteed by both interior ministries have in essence been prepared for signing. We agreed that the preliminary date for signing this package of agreements would be the second half of October, after the German election, so that the affair surrounding the agreements could be depoliticized. This package consists of a readmission agreement, an agreement on cooperation in projecting the consequences of migration—and this is the financial assistance—an agreement on border tourism, including tourist paths and tourist areas, an agreement on the state border—this is the big presidential agreement [velka prezidentska smlouva] on the final confirmation of the border dividing the Czech Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany—and an agreement on facilitating border procedures in road, rail, and water transport.

This then is the package of agreements due to be signed in the second half of October. It is a very important signal in Czech-German relations.

As for the actual, in quotation marks, financial assistance, which will be spent in the Czech Republic on removing the consequences of migration—and these could ensue from the readmission agreement and be used to improve the technical backup of the border police to create central data systems for the aliens police and asylum centers—Minister Kanther and I agreed on the sum of 60 million German marks. This sum will be spread over a three-year period. The first payment will be in 1995, the second in 1996, and the third in 1997. The last payment in 1997 is conditional upon an assessment of the security situation in the migration area. [end recording]

[Halousek] Jan Ruml went on to tell me that the German interior minister would attach an accompanying letter to the official text of the readmission agreement. In it, the Federal Government will guarantee that the provisions of this agreement do not apply to so-called old cases—in other words, to those refugees who are already in Germany—and that the agreement will deal with cases only from the moment of its coming into force. This guarantee was one of our side's requirements during the uneasy, yet currently successfully completed, negotiations.

Commentary: Coalition Government at Halfway Mark

94CH0400A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 13 Jul 94 p 5

[Commentary by Jan Stetka: "Coalition Before Stock-taking"]

[Text] The spring session of the parliament is over and it appears that, despite the respectable 40 laws that were passed, the deputies of the governing parties still have plenty to think about. Beyond the horizon of the summer recess, there looms a number of problems that were put off and with which the deputies will have to wrestle again beginning in September. Whether it be that cursed and through-the-mud-dragged Senate, the land administration setup, or final settlement of restitutions, it is clear that, until the coalition first comes to terms internally with the legacy of the hastily stitched-together Constitution, it will not be granted a peaceful atmosphere for dealing with the current issues that are troubling the citizens.

The squabbling within the coalition obviously reached a climax during May and June, when (as was recently humorously expressed by a LIDOVE NOVINY cartoonist) every possible grimace was used up and total silence broke out. Whereas in January and February the heads of all four parties still scintillated with optimism because they thought they were playing a harmless game for small concessions among themselves, during the spring the atmosphere gradually grew colder. The specter of local elections, mutual suspicions of hungering after power, and, in the end, the crystallizing real differences of the governing parties actually led to some political circles viewing tomorrow's planned meeting on the theme "two years of coalition government" almost as the one-time U.S.-Soviet summits. The mood in the coalition is at the freezing point.

But disputes, whether playacted or real, are one thing; another is the desire for and most of all the need to bring the jointly begun work of transforming the state as far as possible—that is, at least to the next parliamentary election. That, of course, gave rise in our parliament to the kind of conduct that is generally called bulldozing. Its advantage is an unrelenting movement forward, but its drawback is a barren furrow and a growing pile of backlog that has been pushed aside. The deputies of the governing parties have already experienced a number of times that, after a vote that is not preceded by debate, come wails and the gnashing of teeth together with intracoalition squabbles. But to unite with the opposition against allies is not possible, at present, so there is pussyfooting around issues, and things are being deferred. Only seldom this spring did the coalition

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manage to abandon this rpractice at key moments and agree on a compromise solution. Besides a number of banal laws, this happened perhaps only in the case of Jewish restitutions (on the second attempt) and the recent amendment of the banking law, which introduced a new system of insuring deposits. In the second case, it was a matter of overcoming the obvious fear of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] of, according to this party, an unpopular step before the coming local election.

Whereas the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA], the Christian Democratic Party [KDS], and the People's Party [CSL] have built their policy on implementing the Constitution (possibly also because they want to differentiate themselves that way from the ODS) and are therefore pushing hard for action, the pragmatic party of Vaclav Klaus is more likely to listen to public opinion and is more and more often playing for time. It knows that the constitutionally guaranteed Senate and the land units do not interest the citizenry very much and, therefore, that it has nothing to lose by taking its time. What is more, if you do nothing, you do not mess up anything. Our strongest party is taking a harder approach in its attacks on its partners for a different reason: It is slowly getting tired of the endless haggling over implementing the Constitution, and it considers the settlement of the restitutions a ball and chain because it would prefer to attend to the more pertinent problems, such as housing, criminality, fine-tuning the banking laws, and so forth. It is therefore precisely the ODS that basically finds the bulldozer tactics convenient when there is no other way.

Immediately after the summer recess, the deputies will have to tackle three proposed laws on election to the Senate. Each one, even though one of them comes from the opposition, in fact represents a section of the spectrum of positions of the coalition parties. Part of the ODS certainly does not find objectionable the proposal by Petra Buzkova (CSSD [Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party]) to take the Senate out of the Constitution of the Czech Republic. Other members of Klaus's party plus the KDS and ODA are in favor of the Senate, and, in order to establish it quickly, they will support the version that does not insist on the so-called Australian electoral system, which is what the People's Party is proposing as the third version. Similar fruitless tussles, ending in debacle, can also be expected when the reform of the land administration and new kraje (lands) are debated. In the end, it is not surprising, therefore, that the tendency to postpone dealing with the "constitutional debts" prevailed, rather than have the consistent rejecting of the individual proposals, including governmental ones, bring attention to the serious rifts in the coalition. Thinking about giving the government a vote of no confidence is pointless because the present coalition still is practically the only possible one. Another idea being considered is to call for a new election, but that ends with the conclusion that the Chamber of Deputies is undissolvable until June 1996. The recent flirtation by the People's Party and others with the idea of revising the Constitution on the grounds that the nonexistent Senate needs to be replaced may have come precisely from that conclusion.

During tomorrow's assessment of the two years of governing, the coalition partners "sentenced" to cooperation will certainly have a lot to say to each other. But, among other things, it should be said emphatically that, without bringing the Constitution and political practice into harmony, any dream of a stabilized society is a house built on sand because its cracks could be exploited anytime by those who may not be all that interested in peaceful development of the country. It is certainly not easy to determine whether the existing stability of the nation will be more harmed by a change in the Constitution or by bringing the Senate it calls for into life. However, any one of the coalition parties that would want to close its eyes to the bad "sandy conditions" in the name of stability and roll over the terrain with an imaginary bulldozer would be shortsighted and could pay for it in the future.

Four Foreign Companies Bidding for Privatization

94CH0404A Prague PRAGUE POST in English 23 Aug 94 p 5

[Article by Michele Kayal: "Foreign Oil May Get Second Chance"]

[Text] Four foreign oil companies bidding to privatize the Czech refining industry—and any other firms who can come up with "serious" offers—may get a second shot as government ministers return to square one in considering the best path for restructuring.

"We are aware that everything got tangled and politicized," said Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus after a special cabinet session last week. "There is no way but to return to the beginning."

After agreeing on the basic point that the Czech Republic will continue refining oil for strategic reasons, Klaus said the ministers agreed to reassess the risk of dividing the country's refining and petrochemical operations. In May, the ministers sidelined a nearly $1 billion bid by International Oil Companies (IOC)—a venture forged by Italy's Agip Petroli, Total of France, the Dutch-English concern Shell and the American Conoco—mainly because it proposed separating those facilities at the country's two major petroleum plants, Chemopetrol Litvinov and Kaucuk Kralupy.

The economic ministers opted instead for the so-called "Czech way," proposed by the refineries' directors. The choice set off accusations by IOC and the media of political motivations, and the director of the foreign-investment liaison agency Czech Invest even criticized the government for nationalistic "chest-beating."

But this proposal too was derailed last month when Klaus said that it did not take privatization far enough. The plan would have created a holding company from

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the refineries that would have been 100 percent owned by the National Property Fund, the state agency that manages privatization. The government would have held a majority for at least five years. A new proposal should be presented to the government by the responsible ministries September 15, and a decision is expected by the end of that month.

But what that proposal will look like is anybody's guess. Klaus and Minister of Industry and Trade Vladimir Dlouhy suggested that all roads are open again. The government will consider anew whether to look for a strategic partner for the industry as a whole or to divide the chemical and refining sectors and whether to find a local industry superhero to manage the change, invite foreign investment or create some role for both. To make matters more complicated, both Klaus and Dlouhy also said many new players have entered the process, although they would not name names. "We will negotiate with all serious possible partners," Dlouhy said.

One of these possible partners is still Chemapol, the country's leading importer of crude oil, which recently came under fire when allegations of links between its top management and the former communist secret police (StB) hit the press. But Dlouhy played down the security threat of having former spies involved in the Czech oil industry.

"Never did we consider this to be the most important factor," he said. "The most important factor is economic." Dlouhy hinted that involvement by any outside party would bring certain influences, but that some types of influence are better than others. "If we're going to be under some pressure, it would be better to be under pressure from firms rooted in the calm, democratic West," he said.

IOC's proposal has remained alive all this time. Although it was scheduled to expire Monday, August 15, IOC officials say they are hanging on, but playing their optimism close to the chest. "This is just the morning after," said IOC's local coordinator Ales Soukup. "It is a signal that the Czech party is still finding the final definition of privatization of the refineries."

Law on Citizens' Defense of State Discussed

LD0809203094 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1600 GMT 8 Sep 94

[Text] Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus today met several ministers to discuss the underlying principles of the constitutional law on the defense of the Czech Republic. According to Minister of Defense Antonin Baudys, this law should lay down the citizens' duty to take part in the defense of the state.

At the moment, this duty is not enshrined in the Constitution. On the basis of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, which lays down the right to the protection of life, citizens do not have to take part in the defense of the state when it is attacked. The ministers agreed that it was necessary to phrase the bill in such a way that it concerns only the external defense of the state and, at the same time, takes into consideration all international-political, military, defense, and economic aspects.

Questions About Modernization of Army Raised

94CH0399A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 4 Aug 94 p 5

[Article by Jiri Franek and Jiri Hanak: "Modernization and a Pigheaded Director"]

[Text] Rearming and modernizing an army is certainly not any less complicated a process than constructing a house. However, while no one would dare build a house without appropriate consideration and from the roof down, we are witnesses to precisely such a procedure with respect to modernizing the Army of the Czech Republic. Without any concept being approved or, if you will, a philosophy for modernizing and rearming, with the deciding institutions (parliament, government) having not made a decision on the basis of specialized expert studies and following responsible negotiations as to what kind of army we shall need and for what purposes, modernization and rearming are beginning. And the beginning is being made from the roof on down: A beginning is being made involving that which should come at the end—in other words, specific acquisition purchases. And there is nonselective pressure being brought to bear by the Army upon producers: Take this or the other for a partner. If you do not, you will be a wanton bungler, and we will complain about your conflict with the Army in both the domestic and the foreign press. In this manner, a black mark was recently earned by Zdenek Chalupnik, the director general of AERO-Vodochody, because he has now refused to immediately select the kind of supplier of avionics for the L-159 aircraft project as was being "offered" by the Army.

Of course, the rearming and modernization of the Czech Army is a business deal. Things are beginning to be a little tight around the multibillion [koruna] pie. In the case of the project involving the new light model L-159 combat aircraft, this is particularly true. So Director Chalupnik is a bungler who is coming into conflict only because he does not wish to immediately take either Rockwell or Allied Signal into his project. And there is practically no longer any talk about the third participant in the second round of the selection proceedings—Elbit. And, at that, Elbit is no technical dropout; it cooperates with General Dynamics as a supplier of avionics for the supermodern F-16. It has one infinite advantage: It produces avionics, and it does not manufacture aircraft. Rockwell has a noteworthy disadvantage: It produces aircraft. It took a lot of work for the Vodochody people to force competitors out of the world markets. Are they now to allow them to elbow their way in because someone is opening the back door?

Those armament plants that do not export do not have a rosy future. The small Czech Army cannot sustain them.

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AERO-Vodochody is, today, the most important and most successful armament enterprise in the Czech Republic. Moreover, it has a future because the absolute majority of its production is exported, part of it precisely through Elbit.

Thus far, the dispute regarding the supplier of avionics for future aircraft has been presented in both the domestic and the foreign press as a dispute between the Army and the pigheaded director general of the Vodochody enterprise. Actually, however, neither the Army nor the director general can resolve this question. It is primarily a complicated technical and economic problem, the solution of which is currently being worked on by a whole series of highly qualified employees, specialists in the civilian as well as in the military sector.

What actually happened and the true reason for that "conflict" is that Director Chalupnik refused to let the commission that will provide the fundamental recommendation for the selection of the supplier begin its work until such time as the specialists prepare a qualified expert opinion to permit the government and the parliament to render their opinion regarding the L-159 project—that is to say, precisely until 1 September. According to some representatives of the Army (particularly, however, according to one individual), this responsible approach has "delayed" the project that had been scheduled to run for years by one month. In other words, it has not been delayed; the preparation of documentation had its deadline long before there were any accusations of delay.

In other words, the core of the conflict is imperceptible. What follows is, at the very least, disproportionate. Perhaps it is caused by an increase in the production of adrenaline as a consequence of the hot weather. Perhaps it has to do with who must obey whom in the postcommunist society. After all, this is also the way in which large conflicts come into being and grow. But if Frantisek Veprek, director of the Main Directorate of Material-Technical Support of the Ministry of Defense, tells journalists that the delay "discredits us in the eyes of our foreign partners," it sounds strange. Did any one of those foreign partners negotiate with him? Did someone try to exert pressure? Veprek's clumsy statement gives rise to such questions.

Heroin Freely Available on Prague Streets

94CH0398A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 10 Aug 94 p 2

[Article by (ms): "Street Sale of Heroin Is No Exception"]

[Text] Prague (ms)—Just two years ago, the police concentrated their attention mainly on soft drugs. Today, spectacular scenes from a hunt for a hemp grower would no longer impress anyone because hard drugs, exactly according to warning predictions of experts, have entered the youth clubs.

Today there is no need to buy heroin surreptitiously in discotheques and restrooms in the clubs, says Jiri Presl, from the DROP IN center in Prague, which administers the Endowment for the Prevention and Treatment of Drug Addiction and AIDS. Street sales have already been professionalized in the capital, and the most frequented place for buying heroin is Republic Square. Hard drugs are sold everywhere young people congregate, in the streets adjacent to Wenceslas Square, in cafes, passageways, and discotheques. Young people in clubs experiment with LSD trips, and in expensive discotheques with cocaine.

The price of heroin declined, according to Jiri Presl, by two-thirds compared to last year. A buyer will now pay between 900 and 1,000 Czech korunas for three-quarters of a gram. "At first this amount is sufficient for a week, but six months later it may not be enough for even one day," says Presl. The change in price is logical because even "illegal" drugs are merchandise. Sellers need a large turnover and, thus, an ever-expanding circle of consumers; that is the law of the market.

Jiri Presl has been dealing with the drug problem for 13 years, and the situation in the Czech Republic does not surprise him. "The attraction of drugs for young people can be compared to the atmosphere of the 1960's in the West." Presl sees the problem, among other things, in the fact that, to date, there is no functioning social net for people who already are taking drugs and want to talk about it with someone. There are only two centers in the capital for making the first contact, and they are kept in operation mainly by benefactors. Yet, under the circumstances, according to Presl, there should be in only Prague alone a similar facility in every district. Society also has to expect that there will be people who are dependent on drugs and have no intention of getting treatment to get rid of their dependency. In the West, they are trying to protect such people from an even worse impact on their health. For example, drug addicts are getting free hypodermic needles, and their treatment includes teaching them proper hygiene. Here, the standard of hygiene among drug addicts is very low. "For the time being, society does not admit it to itself, but this is precisely where an explosive spread of AIDS could come from," says Presl. Half of the children in high schools reportedly have had experience with drugs. According to Presl, even a 16-year-old girl who perhaps on the spur of the momemnt decides to try drugs just once at a discotheque is in danger of being infected with AIDS. J. Presl is convinced that drug prevention should be taught as early as in elementary school. That way, drugs would lose their aura of mystery and forbidden fruit.

Special Police Units Prepare To Fight Crime

94CH0398B Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 3 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by (il): "Special Units Against Organized Crime"]

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[Text] Prague (il)—Because coordination of the fight against organized crime is at present somewhat disjointed, the Czech Republic Police think that, by reorganizing the individual special units, they will make the action against this criminal activity more effective. The director of the Service for Uncovering Corruption and Serious Economic Crimes (SPOK), Jan Sula, reported this in an interview for LIDOVE NOVINY.

The ideal solution, in his view, would be to create an organization that would, together with a joint analytical group, coordinate the activity of four basic special units directed at drugs, terrorism and weapons, financial crimes, and criminal organizations that do not fall into the above-mentioned first three groups. The creation of such a system can be expected toward the end of the year. But, according to Sula, in order to make the fight against organized crime more effective, many legislative measures are needed that would broaden the legal powers of the police. For example, the present laws do not allow the police to plant an undercover police officer in a criminal organization. For the police to have this effective "weapon" in its hand, legislative measures must by designed so that a police officer who infiltrates an organization cannot be punished as a member of it. According to Sula, this is only one of the proposals presented by the police that would be of significant help.

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Roman Kovac Rejects Cairo Proabortion Document

LD0809193994 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1500 GMT 8 Sep 94

[Text] The abortion issue in the recommendation document of the Cairo International Conference on World Population and Development is outlined as a method to regulate the population and, in substance, is a contraception method—unacceptable from the medical point of view, as well.

This was stated by Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Roman Kovac in an interview for the Press Agency of the Slovak Republic. He reacted to a CTK report, according to which Slovakia has joined the other eight states in supporting the Vatican point of view and rejecting a compromise agreement on the right to abortion.

According to Kovac, the recommendation document is formulated in a way as to call on all states to adopt the same laws on this issue—and the Slovak side disagrees with this. It proposes that every single country adopts its own laws in accordance with its own specific situation.

Austrian Chancellor Arrives for One-Day Visit

LD0909084194 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0800 GMT 9 Sep 94

[Text] Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky has arrived in Slovakia for a one-day official visit. During his visit, he is due to sign intergovernmental documents between Slovakia and Austria.

In the course of the visit, which is taking place at the invitation of Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik, the Austrian chancellor will meet parliament speaker Ivan Gasparovic and representatives of the Party of the Democratic Left and of the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia. Vranitzky will also be received by President Michal Kovac.

Meciar Answers Questions at News Conference

AU0909103994 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 6 Sep 94 p 10

[Unattributed report on news conference given by former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, with unidentified correspondents, in Bratislava on 4 September, "recorded" by Julius Gembicky: "V. Meciar: The Very Formation of Moravcik's Government Was Nonsense"]

[Text] "Of the 18 parties seeking posts in the parliament, 14 were lukewarm to the idea of Slovakia's own statehood or even against it," HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] Chairman Vladimir Meciar said in the opening speech at the news conference organized by the Association of Slovak Journalists in a Petrzalka pizzeria, Miva, on the evening of 4 September. "After October, Slovakia will have its sixth government. It needs stability. Businessmen demand it for at least four years. It would not be a good idea if the future government were to be formed by as many as five political entities. The president can play a significant role after the election. By appointing three unsuitable candidates to form the new government, he can destabilize the postelectoral situation."

After the opening speech, Meciar answered unidentified reporters' questions. We carry at least the most interesting answers.

[Correspondent] An instance of violation of the law occurred last week, when Democratic Union [DU] candidates began to advertise before the official start of the election campaign and did so even with their election number. Could they not be excluded from the campaign for this? Should election contest offenses be prosecuted?

[Meciar] It is even questionable whether DU is taking part in the campaign legally. Moreover, such question marks also hover over the participation of two other parties whose petition sheets have never been properly checked. It is precisely these facts that can lead after the election to doubts about their democratic nature. The legitimacy of DU participation will eventually be judged by the Slovak Constitutional Court. The 10-million-koruna [Kc] spending limit for the political parties is also nonsense. It curbs free political competition. I see good prospects for a transition from the proportional to a majority election system as long as it specifies not only how to obtain but also how to lose the mandate. Hence, it would not be an imperative mandate. The establishment of a parliamentary court, like under the First Republic, would create the possibility of checking a deputy's attendance at some parliamentary sessions or even rejecting or banning it. I would like these laws to be adopted within a year of the election.

[Correspondent] How does the HZDS assess the work of Moravcik's government in the time since its establishment?

[Meciar] The very establishment of Moravcik's government was a fundamental strategic error. It was nonsense from the very beginning. It is a conglomerate of powers that have nothing in common—regarding the program or personally. Social life cannot wait, however, until four or five people agree on something. The political model of Moravcik's government was eventually adjusted so that Durayites [Egyutteles] commandeered the decisive influence. Basically, Moravcik has done very little useful work. The only thing he managed was, beginning on 13 March, to win reporters to his side. Jointly with them, he was preaching that peace was achieved in the country. The tension here was, however, greater than ever before. He made fundamental errors in the economic reform. It will take approximately a year to repair it all. There is the danger of a deficit in excess of Kc50 billion at the end of 1994. Unemployment is growing fast. The rehabilitation of money stopped. I asked ministers of the shadow

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government to assess the work of Moravcik's Cabinet according to their departments. There was nothing to assess. It is not an achieving government, it is not homogeneous, and it never really shaped up. It represents for society a loss of Kc15 billion.

[Correspondent] Can the HZDS address a sufficiently large percentage of so-far undecided voters?

[Meciar] There is more than one mode of address. Many political parties have not really shaped up. We have an unequivocal program and stable membership. In the participation of our supporters in the election, it is not important for us how many people do not show up. It is important that the voter finds the meaning of the election. The political parties' trend hitherto is beginning to backfire. The voters are reaching the stage of no longer caring about themselves—or us.

[NARODNA OBRODA] The HZDS chairman described the conceivable replacement of Vladimir Meciar by Peter Weiss [SDL, Party of the Democratic Left] as disproportional. "The SDL would have to replace me with many more people," he added. He did not deny the existence of offers of a postelection coalition from the SDL and the KDH [Christian Democratic Movement] even at the cost of these entities deposing their leadership. The chairman symbolizes his party. Can a party disown its chairman, who has his influence in society? If this happened, the party that ousted its chairman would lose the very next election. Therefore, such an idea has no chance. "For the HZDS, it would be the first step to self-destruction," he emphasized.

[Correspondent] There were rumors in connection with the election that the HZDS candidates had to sign a promise that, if successful,, and if they wanted to leave your parliamentary club, they would cover the cost of your election campaign up to the amount of Kc5 million. Is this true?

[Meciar] Slovakia does not have enough moral inhibitions to prevent a deformation of the election results. Therefore, instead of working on legislation, the deputies are hunted down. There should be legislation on loss of mandate. The new government will have to prepare a law on the position of deputies, a law on conflict of interests, so that finances are transparent. The suspicion that there were bribes behind the transfers of deputies from individual clubs is so great that we cannot continue to ignore it. Therefore, it will be necessary to form an investigative commission after the election so the citizens learn how much certain deputies received for their transfer. Regarding the signature on the promise by our candidates, each of them had voluntarily written an affidavit that they would lose their mandate if they left the club or the movement. The promise is of a moral nature.

[Correspondent] Preelection support threatens to result in a stalemate situation. Would the HZDS be willing, in the interest of political stability of Slovakia, instead of repeating the election, to enter into a coalition with either Common Choice or the KDH without the political top brass?

[Meciar] We could hardly accept such a possibility. It is absurd to expect from us announcements in which we would court, before the election, other parties that are in deep crisis. The SDL is experiencing not a political but a deep moral crisis. If they want to bear moral responsibility for the state, they cannot force on anyone the conditions under which they would enter a postelectoral coalition. Nobody can force his will on us! Even if we were to stay in the opposition. Each of us has a certain influence in his party. If Moravcik determines internal disintegration in his party and the fall after the election, if Carnogursky has the KDH split, they cannot force on us their conditions after the election. [end Meciar]

At the end of the news conference, Meciar commented on the activity of the Slovak president and on the work of Prime Minister Moravcik in Leninist Spark [Leninska Iskra]:

"With the exception of KDH Chairman Jan Carnogursky, not a single party has publicly declared its support for President Michal Kovac. He is not a strong president who enjoys the support of the population or political entities. The president is entrusted with a lot of work in the executive power and is not subject to control by the parliament. The parliament can control the president only if he violates the constitutional system or is suspected of treason." Meciar pointed out that, regardless of a specific person, the president of the Slovak Republic executes his powers without any control by any democratic institution in Slovakia. This alone is a violation of parliamentarism de facto, and this state must be corrected.

Further, the HZDS chairman expressed his surprise that nobody has investigated the activity of the Leninist Spark after the introduction of Gorbachev's restructuring in this country. No one cares what was behind it. "It was not a sovereign organization. It was controlled by the consul general, and it had four instructors who came from Moscow and issued orders." As Meciar said, it had been operating since 1986, and that is documented in rather thick files. "Most of them are in Prague, some in Slovakia. The Slovak Information Service claims it does not have them, but it does, and filed under the heading 'Scarab.'" Meciar specified that the representatives of the Leninist Spark "sit in the Government Office, in various editorial offices and special institutions of this state."

Meciar's Third Bid for Power Analyzed

94CH0405A Prague PRAGUE POST in English 23 Aug 94 p 1

[Commentary by Kevin Drew: "Political Leader Who Just Won't Lie Down and Die"]

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[Text] Bratislava—Twice ejected from power as prime minister of Slovakia, attacked by foes and former friemds alike for incompetence and corruption, Vladimir Meciar still has more popular support than any other politician in the country—and could well be the decisive figure in next month's elections.

The allegations against him would have driven most leaders to an early political grave, but his aggressive populism—scorning the economic doomsayers and hurling mud at all who dare accuse him—gives him a tight hold on the allegiance of at least a quarter of the population.

Even if he is unable to regain power, he could still play the critical role in determining who forms the next government.

As Slovakia's parliament entered its final session this week, support for Meciar and his Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) remained steady, raising speculation that he could fracture the coalition that has run the country since his fall from power last spring.

On August 11, the national elections commission released a list of 18 parties and coalitions qualified to run candidates in the elections, scheduled for September 30 and October 1. But out of this plethora, it is Meciar who continues to galvanize the political scene.

He is already a unique figure in post-communist Europe: No other politician in a former East Bloc country has twice been voted into office and twice removed; the autumn elections will be his third bid for power.

In its latest poll, released August 12, the Focus agency showed HZDS with other 28 percent support and Meciar himself with over 26 percent.

"Meciar and HZDS will get more votes than anyone else," said Focus director Tatiana Rosova. "The question remains whether he can form a ruling coalition."

That appears unlikely. HZDS' public support is down 10 percent from two years ago, when it led the Slovak Republic's drive toward independence. High-profile mutinies within the party, such as the one led by current Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik, and Meciar's continued antagonistic rhetoric toward Hungary and Slovakia's Hungarian community have taken their toll. The anticipated alliance with the right-wing Slovak National Party (SNS) has repelled many other parties.

But it is the perceived foot-dragging on economic reform that may hurt Meciar and his party the most. HZDS opponents have continually charged that a Meciar government will scare away badly needed foreign investment.

"Most party leaders believe a Meciar government will have trouble with the West," Rosova said.

Ivan Miklos, a researcher for the Mesa 10 agency and a member of the Democratic Party, put it more succinctly: "The question isn't whether the HZDS will run the next government. Some coalition will form. The real question is whether the current coalition can continue to work together."

The past five months have seen an interim government of unlikely partners cautiously working with each other. The conservative Christian Democrats (KDH), the former communist Democratic Left Party (SDL) and the liberal Democratic Union (DU) have been united in their opposition to Meciar. But sharp differences exist between the KDH and SDL on how to manage privatization and on the future of the *lustace* law, which bans former communist secret agents from serving in government until 1996.

Speculation continues that the SDL could split, with many old-guard former communists throwing their support behind Meciar.

Meanwhile, Moravcik's popularity has also been growing, up from 14 percent in July to nearly 20 percent this month.

Most observers agree that it is still too early to predict the face of the next Slovak government. The uncertainly appears to be an unexpected burden of democracy.

"In the past, during the federal era, it was easy for us," said journalist Pavol Tvarozek. "We could vote for as many as three parties for three different chambers. Now we have just one parliament, and we have to decide."

New Party Elects Agnac Chabron as Chairman

AU0909082894 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 5 Sep 94 p 2

[TA SR report in the "From Sessions of Supreme Bodies of Political Parties and Movements" column]

[Text] Bratislava—The basic programmatic orientation and the party program were approved by delegates to the first general assembly of the Republicans '77 [Republikani '77) in Bratislava on 3 September. Ignac Chabron, formerly chairman of the Preparatory Committee, was elected party chairman. According to a statement provided to the TA SR, the Republicans '77 will support candidates of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the Slovak National Party in the coming parliamentary election.

'Royalist Association' Registers at Ministry

AU0909082994 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 6 Sep 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "King in Slovakia?"]

[Text] Nitra—The Nitra-based Slovak Royalist Association [Slovenske rojalisticke zdruzenie] has been registered with the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic, Stefan Minarik, the association's executive secretary [konatel], told the TA SR correspondent in

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Nitra yesterday. Milan Mojs-Kovac, president of the Slovak People's Union, is the association's honorary head.

Gen Tuchyna Named First Chief of General Staff

AU0909083094 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 2 Sep 94 p 2

[TA SR report in the "Briefly" column]

[Text] At a rally of members of the Army Command of the Slovak Republic held in the House of the Army in Trencin on 31 August, Slovak Defense Minister Pavol Kanis promulgated an order that changes the Army Command of the Slovak Republic into the General Staff of the Army of the Slovak Republic as of 1 September 1994, on the basis of a resolution of the State Defense Council. He also promulgated an order of the president of the Slovak Republic whereby Colonel General Jozef Tuchyna, adviser to the minister of defense of the Slovak Republic heretofore, was appointed chief of General Staff of the Slovak Republic Army.

Council Dispossesses Army of Training Areas

AU0909103294

[Editorial Report] Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak and Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 27 August both publish correspondents' reports on the 26 August session of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, the last before the parliamentary election, which discussed a number of Army-related issues.

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 27 August on pages 1 and 2 carries a 1,000-word Stefan Hrcka report entitled "Knocking Off After Unfinished Work." The report includes the following passage: "At the outset of yesterday's deliberations, the deputies approved an amendment to the Slovak National Council Law on Community Property, which will go into effect on 1 November 1994. The gist of the amendment is a provision under which plots that communities have not yet received because at the time the previous amendments to the Law on Community Property went into force the plots had not been in the ownership of the Slovak Republic but in the ownership of the then CSFR are being transferred from the ownership of the Slovak Republic into the ownership of communities. As a consequence of this amendment, communities will obtain plots within the army's training grounds, including, for example, the Javorina military training compound (VVP). If called upon by the state by 30 June 1995, communities are obliged to conclude a contract on the substitution of plots that have been returned to them and that are essential to secure the defense of the Republic for other state plots. Until then, the Army will be authorized to use community-owned plots in military areas."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 27 August on page 1 carries a 600-word Martin Kovacic report entitled "Unceremonious End to the Parliament's Activity." The report states: "In a brief interview for NARODNA OBRODA, Defense Minister Pavol Kanis delivered his opinion on the approved Law on Community Property, which allows the communities, for instance, to lay claim to the territory of the Javorina VVP. According to the minister, the law does not resolve anything and has only established prerequisites for a stalemate. He voiced his disappointment over the deputies' failure to accept his proposal, under which landowners in the Javorina VVP were to receive plots in the same territory but not those that are essential for the training of troops. According to his words, the passage of the law represents victory of populism over a careful consideration of the situation." In conclusion, Kanis reportedly voiced the conviction that the next parliament will have to return to the issue in order to "finally settle property-related issues in the Javorina VVP."

Bratislava SMENA in Slovak on 30 August on pages 1 and 2 carries an 800-word Roman Slusny article entitled "Let the Forest Stay." The article reviews the history of the conflict between the Army and the communities adjacent to the Javorina VVP over who owns the land and the forests in the area. Slusny says that the amendment passed by the parliament on 26 August is likely to cause a "big shock" at the Ministry of Defense because, according to Defense Minister Kanis, "it provides no guarantee that the training areas, which the Army needs in the interest of its restructuring, will be preserved." Finance Minister Rudolf Filkus is also reported to have voiced objections to the legislation because the state budget cannot afford to purchase the land in question or to make available to the communities alternative plots of the same quality.

New Highways, Connections to West Planned

94CH0403A Prague PRAGUE POST in English 23 Aug 94 p 6

[Article by Michele Kayal: "Slovakia Plans Highway to West"]

[Text] Bratislava—Slovakia will soon begin building its first highway to the West, a link that will form the main leg of a Central European transport triangle and might one day give the small landlocked nation easy access to the ports of the Adriatic.

Slovakia and Austria were scheduled to sign a final agreement August 17 that would pave the way for construction on the 2.7-kilometer (1.7-mile) motorway from Jarovce to the Austrian border town of Kittsee. The steamrollers should begin work in 1995 and finish in 1997. The short stretch, an extension of Slovakia's D61 highway, which runs from Bratislava northeast to Trencin, will be the first stage of a larger project that will link Vienna, Budapest and Bratislava by 1998.

"Building highways to Austria is a priority for the Slovak government," said Marcela Sajtlavova, the Ministry of

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Economy's director of economic strategy. "Of developed countries, Austria is the closest to the Slovak republic, and it can help Slovakia enter the European Union more quickly. We have good contacts with Austrian institutions, and good relations with entrepreneurs."

Hooking into the Austrian road system also will let Slovakia take advantage of its neighbor's links to Switzerland and Italy.

In 1996, the government plans to begin construction of the 5.7-kilometer highway from Bratislava south to Jarovce. The remaining 9.2-kilometer stretch from Jarovce to the Hungarian border is scheduled for completion by 1998. This last leg, an extension of the Czech-Slovak D2 highway, will hook into the Hungarian road network that leads to Budapest. A direct connection between Vienna and Budapest already exists.

"Within three to five years of finishing the highway, the Bratislava-Budapest-Vienna connection will be the trade heart of Europe," Sajtlavova said. "It will connect East and West." By 2010, some 10,000 cars a day are expected to travel in each direction between Budapest and Bratislava.

The government hopes to fund the 3.9 billion Sk ($130 million) project—and all other infrastructure developments—with the help of financial institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank and the European Investment Bank, Sajtlavova said. The government plans to spend 100 billion Sk (3.3 billion) in the near future to add 453 kilometers of motorway to the existing 198-kilometer network. Thirty percent of the money for these projects will come from state coffers, Sajtlavova and others said, and 70 percent is expected to be furnished by the banks.

"The [state's road construction] fund has the money," said Rudolf Puskas of the Slovak Highway Directorate, "but it's supposed to be used for all the roads in Slovakia, not just this motorway. So there might be a need for more money." The government will also collect a fee from vehicles using the new motorways, but the amount has not yet been determined, Puskas said.

The Slovak government has made highway development and general improvement of infrastructure an economic priority. Steadily decreasing industrial production since 1989 has halved the amount of goods transported each year to 117,300 tons, but the importance of road transport continues to grow. Tons per kilometer transported by road rose steadily from 4,600 in 1989 to 6,200 in 1993. Tons per kilometer hauled by rail and water both decreased during the same period.

The planned development of the north-south D61 would also pave the way for the Trans European Motorway, Puskas said, which European highway officials hope will one day create a direct link from Gdansk, Poland, all the way to Turkey. Four-lane motorways would be built off this main artery to the harbors of the Slovenian and Italian Adriatic coasts, Puskas said.

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Defense Minister Discusses Army Budget Problems

AU0909082194 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 8 Sep 94 p 6

["V.P"-initialed report on interview with Hungarian Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti: place and date not given: "The Defense Ministry Is Preparing for Crisis Management"]

[Text] According to Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti, the ministry and the Hungarian Army are in a critical situation because of the lack of funds. However, nothing can be done except acknowledge the limitations of the supplementary budget.

Speaking about the financial situation of the Defense Ministry, Gyorgy Keleti said that, in nominal terms, not much money has been taken away from the ministry in the past four years. However, taking the year 1989 as a basis, the then 100 percent today represents a smaller amount by about 60 percent. "An Army that did not carry out basic organizational changes in this time and in which the personnel did not change substantially cannot be financed with such an amount." As a result, the increase in the wages of professional soldiers lags behind the rate of inflation, and this harms the mood of the Army. According to Gyorgy Keleti, psychological factors also contribute to this mood deterioration. "The Army personnel are also sensitive to the inequalities present in the level of burdens." Asked what he meant, Gyorgy Keleti told us that an Army officer who has lunch in a decaying mess can justifiably be irritated by the sight of elegant waiters serving lunch to the heads of the Defense Ministry in their studies. Therefore, one of the first orders issued by Keleti was to make sure that those who have lunch should eat in "normal halls." He himself has his lunch in such a dining hall, which led to some surprise initially. "There are also more serious issues. While an officer had to stand a test trial to prove his point on the amount of money he is entitled to during his vacation, the high-ranking officials who left the Ministry following the government change received quite large sums of money. One of the them got 1.22 million Hungarian forints [HUF] in addition to his salary in 1993, and HUF2.683 million in addition to his salary in the first half of 1994. In the first half of 1994, another high-ranking official got HUF1.869 million in this period; a third official got HUF1.652 million; a fourth got HUF1.914 million; and a fifth got HUF2.555 million. These are downgraded figures. I could also say that, compared to what the Army officers receive for a lifetimes work, these high- ranking officials get quite a bundle. I would refrain from qualifying this state of affairs morally."

Gyorgy Keleti then reminded us that, with the exception of the MiG-29 aircraft received in exchange for the outstanding debts, no other purchase whatsoever has been made; moreover, the infrastructural investments connected with the MiG-29s involve an unplanned expenditure of more than HUF1 billion. At the same time, in a democracy, the Army "cannot sail against the trend in society" and when there are serious health, welfare, and education problems, the Army can do nothing else but accept the realities. The problems of the Army cannot be solved to the detriment of welfare or education; in other words, the Army should adapt to the situation. "After all, we will manage with the funds Parliament will approve for us in the supplementary budget. This means that the troops and various levels of Army headquarters will also have to save money, and I think that the ministry and the Army command should do the same." Asked about this, Gyorgy Keleti said that a reduction in Defense Ministry personnel can begin within a month, and structural concepts will emerge on eliminating the expensive and superfluous parallels.

As a result, a total of 250 people will work in the Defense Ministry, instead of the current 320. Gyorgy Keleti does not think that a similar reduction will take place at the Army command level because, according to the long-term plans, so-called intermediate command levels will be eliminated with the limitation of the military leadership structure. "Probably two military zones will remain from the current four military zones. Various commands will be eliminated, and the military zones will directly belong to the General Staff. No decisions have yet been made on these issues, but I think the public has the right to know the types of solutions we are thinking of. For the General Staff to be able to carry out its tasks in such a direct way, we need an adequate number of personnel and adequate professional knowledge. Therefore, the reduction of personnel will be smaller here than in the Defense Ministry."

Obviously, just like the previous reorganizations, this one also represents a serious burden for the professional staff. Gyorgy Keleti agreed with this and added that, according to the plans, the law on the soldiers' legal status will have been adopted by the time all this is implemented. He hopes that this will provide more favorable conditions than hitherto for the professional soldiers, for example at their relocation. In addition, the Army is striving to primarily help the professional soldiers burdened with the military life at the troops level. Gyorgy Keleti wants to put an end to the practice of almost unlimited support provided by the Defense Ministry; there were cases in which an officer received three or four allowances a month. In Keleti's plans, the maximum allowance at the Defense Ministry would be one and a half monthly wages, and the maximum allowance at the troops would be two to three monthly wages. The Army wants to support the professional soldiers who are living in apartments owned by the local government and where the maintenance costs have increased considerably.

We also asked the minister what the possible further rationalization would mean for the troops, and whether we have already reached the level where saving money threatens the soldiers' combat readiness. For example,

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could the fact that Hungarian pilots fly very few training hours because of the high costs lead to accidents? Gyorgy Keleti said that the pilots fly about 80-90 hours a year, and very few countries in Europe have fewer flying hours for their pilots. The general norm is 120-160 hours; reducing the current 80-90 hours even further would indeed by dangerous. All the military exercises planned for the second half of this year have been dropped, with the exception of the Hungarian-British joint military exercises. Gyorgy Keleti considers it painful that they also must save on the soldiers' food; the soldiers do not lack food, but many places only offer one menu now, instead of the previous two. The soldiers' food is not modern and not healthy. Gyorgy Keleti also deplores the fact that no funds are available for building additional washrooms and carrying out repair work in dilapidated barracks, and this makes life more difficult for the soldiers.

The lack of funds also leads to the fact that firms connected with the Defense Ministry do not get orders, and this might also lead to a reduction in personnel in these firms. Social security payments also constitute a serious burden for the Army, and they would prefer to pay with buildings, for example, instead of cash, but the social security service would also prefer cash.

Gyorgy Keleti concluded by saying that these problems will continue to accompany the Army for a long time. The new Defense Ministry leadership is drawing up a list of priorities, and they regard combat readiness and ease of deployment as the most important tasks. "We can accomplish this goal if we place the men's energy, will, and motivation at the service of these goals"—Gyorgy Keleti said in conclusion.

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CR Minister Signs Border Cooperation Agreement

LD0809133494 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1316 GMT 8 Sep 94

[Excerpts] Warsaw, 8 Sep (PAP)—In Warsaw today, Andrzej Olechowski and Josef Zieleniec, the Polish and the Czech foreign ministers, signed an agreement between the two governments on border cooperation. After the talks in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Czech minister told journalists that Polish-Czech bilateral cooperation is very good. However, he said he regards the lobbying for Visegrad Group states to become EU members as not necessary.

The ministers discussed mainly bilateral cooperation and cooperation within CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement). According to unofficial information, during tomorrow's meeting with the Polish prime minister, Minister Zieleniec will convey an invitation for Waldemar Pawlak from Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus to visit the Czech Republic [CR]. Another meeting of the two prime ministers is planned for this fall in Poznan, Poland. [passage omitted]

Both ministers stressed the intensity of Polish-Czech relations. Poland is the first state with which teh CR signed an agreement on border cooperation. The agreement is about direct contacts—economic, social, professional—between local authorities and communities, particularly in border areas. The agreement is in accordance with laws on cooperation in the Euroregions. There are several Euroregions on the Polish-Czech border. For example, Upper Silesia and North Moravia cooperate.

Turkish Defense Minister Begins Contacts

TA0909134294 Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish 2130 GMT 8 Sep 94

[Announcer-read report]

[Text] Turkish Defense Minister Mehmet Golhan, who is in Poland on an official visit, has started his contacts. Golhan met with President Lech Walesa, the parliament speaker, the prime minister, and the defense minister separately in Warsaw.

Golhan stated that issues such as the political situation in Europe and the development of military cooperation between the two countries were emphasized during the meetings, in addition to bilateral relations. Golhan also noted that Turkey supports Poland's efforts to unite with NATO.

Finance Minister Views Economic, Political Scene

BR0809131394 Brussels LE SOIR in French 8 Sep 94 p 2

[Interview with Polish Finance Minister Grzegorz Kolodko by Pol Mathil; place and date not given: "Grzegorz Kolodko on the First Year of the Left's Return to Power in Poland"]

[Text] [Mathil] On 19 September, it will have been one year since the election that ushered into power the two leftist parties stemming from the former Communist regime. What is your assessment of this first year?

[Kolodko] The overall assessment is undoubtedly positive. The basic economic coefficients have been stabilized: Annual growth is about 5 percent, thus allowing the gradual alleviation of the cost of the reforms, which, it should be pointed out, are continuing.

Unlike what certain people were expecting and even hoping for, the leftist government neither stopped nor slowed down the transformation toward a market economy. The budget deficit will exceed 4 percent this year, with a goal of 3.2 percent—that is, half as much as in Belgium. Inflation is under control. It was 37 percent one year ago, and it will be 26 or 27 percent by the end of this year. Obviously that is too high. Our objective is to drop below 10 percent in 1997.

[Mathil] Are not these successes also the result of the work carried out by previous teams?

[Kolodko] There is continuity in the economic process. Our current difficulties are just as much due to the heritage of the communist regime as to the mistakes in management by Solidarity. As for the successes of our economy, they must be attributed to both the work done by the Solidarity teams in the years 1989-93 and the year of administration by a leftist government.

[Mathil] How do you explain the return of the postcommunist left to power in several former Soviet bloc countries? Is this merely a protest vote caused by the price of the reforms, or is it also a question of "short-term and ungrateful memory" of nations, in general?

[Kolodko] The main mistake of the governmental teams after the fall of the Berlin Wall was to promise what was unrealistic. After four years, society felt betrayed and noticed the wide gap between what had been promised and what had been achieved. In addition, there is the real cost of the reform and the drop in real income. One cannot judge the situation solely by the display windows in Warsaw's boutiques. I can show you regions where unemployment affects 40 percent of the population. There are a large number of discontented people in all of the postcommunist countries. Sometimes they are in the majority. In Poland, 7 million retired people have seen their pensions shrink. Their logic is simple: Perhaps under another government, our pensions will rise again. And so they vote for the opposition. If income drops further, perhaps our government, too, will pay in turn. So this is not so much a slide to the left but a manifestation of social discontent.

[Mathil] Your coalition with the Peasant Party seems fragile.

[Kolodko] Each party represents the interests of its voters. Naturally, there are difficulties, but our coalition is capable of following a long-term policy. Few people in

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the West realize that, in Poland, 38 percent of the population lives in the country and 28 percent works in the agricultural sector. It is therefore necessary to provide a certain level of protection for this sector.

[Mathil] Just after its arrival in power in Poland and Hungary, the left, under different pretexts, criticized officials in the Foreign Ministry. Does this signal a change in the major foreign policy options?

[Kolodko] No. There is consensus on the basic options: opening up to the West; continuing integration into Western structures, such as the European Union (EU) and NATO; and the hope of getting full EU membership in the year 2000.

[Mathil] Poland has excellent relations with the West but poor relations with Russia. Is that not a paradox when, in both countries, former members of the communist system are in power?

[Kolodko] That is absurd. There is no comparison. Our prime minister has just turned 34. He is from a completely different generation. These are political groups that are totally different. Our relations are good with the West because the situation there is stable. In the East, on the other hand, there are enormous problems. Sometimes we cannot figure out who to talk to. Having said that, the East has enormous markets, which are of fundamental importance to us.

[Mathil] Some politicians, including some in your country, have raised the following question: Should we insist on joining the EU when it is in poor shape and powerless in the face of new challenges, such as Bosnia? How do you respond to them?

[Kolodko] We have been Europeans for ages. We want to participate in the process of European integration. We are aware of its weaknesses, but I am sure that the majority of my fellow citizens are convinced that it is in their interest to join the EU.

[Mathil] The EU is Poland's main trade partner. Nevertheless, there are problems. What are they?

[Kolodko] This is a matter of liberalizing our access to Western markets. We would also like to have a timetable for our entry into the EU.

[Mathil] The West reproaches you for having a bureaucratic attitude toward foreign investors. Is it true that a Western capitalist has to deal with 800 legal acts?

[Kolodko] That is nonsense. You must be reading the wrong newspapers! We represent a market of 40 million consumers. The fact that we have settled our debt issue with both private banks and the Western states proves that we are credible and interesting partners. The welcome we give to foreign capital is incomparably better than it used to be.

[Mathil] What do think of the French-German idea of a two-speed Europe? Is not Poland's aspiration to full integration even less realistic today than ever?

[Kolodko] Personally, I am against the establishment of different categories that are more or less removed from the central core. I fear that if a two-speed Europe comes into being, my country, despite all of its efforts, will find itself on the sidelines of such a structure. We aspire to an equal place among free nations.

[Mathil] As the official responsible for the economy of a large country and a university professor, you still find time to write a regular column in a weekly newspaper. Is that a hobby or a pedagogical mission?

[Kolodko] I write late into the night when most of my fellow citizens are watching TV. I do it because I believe that my predecessors did not manage to achieve some of their good ideas not because they were wrong but because they neglected to communicate. It is not enough to be right. You also have to convince the people, the voters.

Lack of EU Integration Strategy Criticized

94EP0085A Warsaw GAZETA BANKOWA in Polish No 33, 13 Aug 94 p 7

[Article by Maria Dunin-Wasowicz: "Neither the Left nor the Right: In Poland, So Many Institutions Are Responsible for the Integration Process That, in Reality, No One Is"]

[Text] Since the signing of the association agreement in 1991, no government has been able to make the political decision about administering the process of political and economic adaptation to Western structures. This lack of a decision is probably the result of the long competition for power between different political groups.

Landless Jacek

Already in 1989, when Poland reached an agreement with the EEC on trade and on trade and economic cooperation, it was clear that there would be an association agreement soon. Thus, it would be necessary to prepare for such institutional changes as would make the process of integration quick and efficient. Such an idea clearly was beyond the abilities of Polish politicians. During the negotiations over the agreement, it was well known backstage that there were conflicts between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. Each pretended to the right to play the lead role in contacts with Brussels and to supervise the integration process. This would mean either the broadening or the lessening of the powers of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. It cannot be ruled out that it was chiefly thanks to this dispute that a third institution was created in early 1991 to ease the tension: the Bureau of European Integration and Foreign Assistance of the Office of the Council of Ministers [BIE]. The position of government plenipotentiary was given to Jacek Saryusz-Wolski. That he has outlasted several governments is a sign not of his good-heartedness but of his ability to create something out of nothing.

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No plenipotentiary could do more than he has done, no matter what one might try. Prognosis 200, for example, and the Commentary on the European Pact came from his office. But the monitoring of trade between Poland and the Twelve was beyond the powers of an office of 32 persons. In Sweden, about 200 persons working with all of the ministries are involved with the problems of integration with the European economy. Until recently, no Polish ministry was required by law to work with BIE. There you have the Poland of fiefdoms.

The situation began to clear up in a way when former Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki began to take care of integration issues in July 1992 (until October 1993). For the year and a half of his presence in the government, he could have moved not a finger—de facto and de jure. He did not have to because, according to a Supreme Chamber of Control (NIK) report, the only document defining the extent of his duties was a phrase in Hanna Suchocka's expose: "If the Council of Ministers is approved in the proposed composition, I plan to entrust the issue of integration into the EC to Minster Bielecki." This meant more or less that Messrs. Wolski and Bielecki had to maintain a dignified silence for a year and a half because it was not, in fact, clear who was in charge.

A Speechless Staff

One might say that cherries became the practical test of the joint actions of these bureaus. Cherries grew exceptionally well in 1993, but there were problems with export because of minimum prices in the EU. Experts from the Ministry of Agriculture then came to Minister Bielecki's aid. This was because the conception of Polish economic and legal adaptation to the European Union intended (properly) that all ministries and offices be part of the program accepted by the Council of Ministers in November 1992 and January 1993.

The programs, as both NIK and the Sejm have noted, were far from perfect. But the ministries themselves were not up to the task and complained loudly about the legislative and organizational work. The Ministry of Industry and Commerce did not prepare a schedule of actions regarding the legal system; the Ministry of Agriculture and the Food Industry began to prepare a Polish food code only a few months ago. The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations did try to advertise the association conditions among Polish exporters and producers, but this ended with 2 billion zlotys' worth of attractive posters being thrown out: The information on the posters was mistaken. The NIK study also shows that those responsible for integration did not have to coordinate their actions through the plenipotentiary. In NIK's opinion, there was a serious danger that different negotiators from different ministries might take different positions on the same issues. Was the idea to lay all of Poland's problems with integration in the lap of the Brussels bureaucracy?

Of course, there is no point in trying to figure out 'who was behind this,' but it happened that, in some ministries, the people supposedly responsible for integration did not know any Western languages. Maybe it is just as well because they would only have made trouble.

Politics Without Strategy

Not long ago, Andrzej Byrt, vice minister of foreign economic relations, summed up the organizational and informational mess very well, saying that contacts with European Commission bureaucrats "scattered among the ministries." (RZECZPOSPOLITA, 1 August 1994)

It looks as though the administration of the integration process in Poland may run along the lines of the Greek model, in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs competes with the Ministry of National Economy for exclusivity in Contacts with the commission. In practice, this means that the strongest position is that of the Greek representation in Brussels. Judging by the experience of BIE, we are not much better than the Greeks.

The "invasion" of European goods into Poland is planned to begin on 1 January 1995. One can be sure that no European from Portugal, Italy, or Germany will miss the date of lowering tariffs on his goods. He will export wherever he does not have to pay too much. Maybe the "scattered" Polish bureaucrats will not notice, but Brussels is preparing new trade conditions (such as, for example, the lowering of payments on poultry).

The Polish Peasant Party's government somehow does not notice what is going on around it, and, instead of preparing the Polish agricultural entrepreneur for European competition, brought about a complete relaxation before the battle. Today the farmer-voter can raise production costs because recompensatory payments rather effectively slow imports from the West. What will he do next year, when an international agreement makes such voter-oriented payment tricks impossible? Even if the European Union is not convenient for the Polish entrepreneur, whining about the Union's double standard regarding the Central and East European countries will not help, nor will meetings of the Association Committee, as long as the center-right or the center-left does not decide how the integration strategy should look. Without one strong integration center (as the Suchocka government proposed), it will be difficult to take advantage of the adjustments the Union has proposed for us (in the Corfu document) or, above all, to make sensible use of all of those sections of the pact (the restructurization clause) that soften the conditions of international competition for some industries and firms.

President Walesa's Media Adviser Resigns

LD0809222194 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2100 GMT 8 Sep 94

[Text] Jan Puzycki, the President's media adviser, has resigned his post and his participation in next year's presidential campaign. In a letter to Lech Walesa, he wrote: I will not be able to carry out all of these tasks

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until a specter of an omnipotent cretin wanders in the presidential palace. Jan Puzycki told Monika Olejnik:

[Begin recording] [Puzycki] In my resignation from the post of presidential adviser, there was a metaphor that I believe is commensurate with a certain phenomenon. Instead of the word thief, you have to use the word cretin. So far, honest people have been removed from the president's environment. I intend to remove the cretin, and that is all.

[Olejnik] And who do you mean when you talk about the cretin?

[Puzycki] Well, I will quote myself: the specter.

[Olejnik] Do you mean Minister Wachowski?

[Puzycki] I said the specter. [end recording]

Here is Minister Andrzej Zakrzewski, the secretary of state in the President's Chancellery.

[Begin recording] [Zakrzewski] I wonder why Mr. Jan Puzycki has suddenly reacted in such a way. He was a frequent visitor in both the Belweder and the Palace for months, if not years. Principally, I would not have anything else to say except what the spokesman said—that different people react in a different manner.

[Olejnik] But Mr. Puzycki said that honest people are being removed and that this metaphor of his was meant to remove a cretin, not using the word thief.

[Zakrzewski] This is Mr. Puzycki's business, but it comes close to actions provided by the Penal Code. [end recording]

Walesa's Preelection Moves, Options Viewed

WS0909103094 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 9 Sep 94 p 3

[Article by Agnieszka Kublik and Dominika Wielowieyska: "Before the Election; President Is Seeking Allies"]

[Text] Lech Walesa is testing the ground in various parties and milieus. He is trying to win the support of the church, Solidarity ["S"], and the right wing. It looks like the president has allies; however, these allies are ready to support him only in the second round of the election. It is still not certain who would vote for him in the first round.

"The announcement to run once again in the presidential election is nothing but a presidential political opinion poll. We will take a close look at who will be with whom, against whom, and against what. And then we will begin acting," says a trusted employee of the president.

The Difficult First Round

The president is fighting for the concordat; he is standing out against the antichurch provision in the Electoral Law; he has vetoed the liberal abortion law. Even though he has always declared his attachment to the church, in recent months he has been doing this more frequently and more emphatically. The president knows that, without the church's support or without at least its acceptance, his chances of winning, if any, are small.

He is also counting on "S" or at least on part of it. He is also pinning his hopes on the right wing—the Alliance for Poland (Christian-National Union—ZChN, Center Accord, Movement for the Republic, Peasant Accord, and Conservative Coalition). The ZChN and part of "S" are today favorably disposed toward Walesa because the president is very prochurch and anticommunist. This does not mean at all that they are ready to support him in the first round.

"S" and the Alliance for Poland are getting ready to field their own common candidate.

Even though on the anniversary of [1980] August Walesa met with "S" for the first time in a year and a half, it is not at all certain whether the meeting was the beginning of a flirtation. Walesa would like to have one, although he is a little afraid of the reclaiming attitudes in the union. The unionists, in turn, do not want their hands to be tied by the president's proreform declarations.

The Alliance for Poland, in turn, wants to take maximum advantage of the presidential elections in order to promote itself. To do this, however, its own candidate would be better.

The church, or at least a part of the clergy, feels attached to "S" by the "S" draft constitution, the content of which is in agreement with the social teaching of the church and with the church's views on abortion.

Thus, the support of bishops and priests may be distributed evenly between Walesa and a candidate fielded by the bloc of "S" and the right wing.

The possibility that the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] will help Walesa in the first round is even more remote than in the case of the right wing.

Peasants traditionally maintained good relations with the president; however, they will probably field their own candidate. First, this is expected by PSL supporters in rural areas, some of whom are not really fond of Lech Walesa. Second, just as in the case of the right wing, it is difficult to give up the chance to advertise oneself in the media—and this is more effective if one's own candidate is waging the election campaign.

The Belweder already denies that Walesa is seeking an agreement with Pawlak and his peasants. "He dislikes the peasants' greediness more and more," assures our interlocutor from the Belweder. Walesa allegedly likes to joke: "Every time I open the refrigerator, I can see the PSL." However, in politics, there are few who are guided by sympathy.

The president did not pass up the Freedom Union [UW] in his opinion-collecting campaign. However, here the

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response is the weakest. The majority of UW will certainly want to have their own candidate. The president's hopes may be based on the fact that neither the UW Presidium nor Chairman Tadeusz Mazowiecki ever decided on a clear declaration: We will certainly not back Lech Walesa in the election.

That means that they do not want to burn bridges. However, Walesa's chances of being supported by UW in the first round are next to none.

The Second Round Easier

The second round is a different story. Here the president has more possibilities. If there arises a need to choose between Walesa and a candidate of the left wing, we will see political bargaining. Then both "S" and the right wing will definitely support the current president.

There are also chances of reaching an agreement with the PSL. The chances will be greatest if Walesa has to compete with an UW candidate. Then, if Walesa promises that relations between the Office of the Council of Ministers and the presidential palace will be good and that Pawlak will be prime minister after the reshuffle, the prime minister is ready to call upon the peasants to vote for Walesa. The situation will become a little more complex if in the second round there appears a candidate of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. Then good relations with the SLD will be more important to the peasants than an alliance with Walesa.

Agreement with UW is least likely, even though the Union never says never.

The President's Dream

However, for Walesa to get to the second round, the following scenario would have to actually occur:

- Foreign Affairs Minister Andrzej Olechowski, who is becoming more and more popular, does not run in the election against Walesa and agrees to work for him.
- The Alliance for Poland and "S" are not able to find a common candidate and decide that they can only support Lech Walesa.

The president has gained quite considerable experience and achieved rather good results in dividing the political scene. "Walesa is strong because of the weakness of his rivals," they say in the Belweder. Indeed, this is an optimal situation for him: the right wing, which is still divided, and the undecided center. Then only he will be able to fight against a left-wing candidate.

Solidarity Meeting With Walesa; Possible Support

WS0809131794 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 8 Sep 94 p 2

[Article by "PAD": "KK Solidarity; Contacts With President Needed"]

[Text] Members of the National Commission [KK] believe that the meeting between its presidium and President Walesa was necessary. They unanimously admit, however, that it is too early to speak about the possibility of supporting Walesa's candidacy for reelection as president. It is certain that Solidarity ["S"] will not field its own candidate.

Without any strong emotions, KK listened to the report on the meeting between the presidium and the president. One of the more curious KK members wanted to know whether Walesa is expecting the union to support him in the election campaign.

"We did not discuss this at all," "S" Chairman Marian Krzaklewski assured us. That was enough. Walesa was invited to the next congress of the union, and the idea was met with applause from most of the gathered persons. It is worth recalling that last year the president did not come to the union's congress, even though he was invited. He said at the time: "It is not my 'S.'" The union did not even listen to Walesa's arguments and decided that it would present its own election lists, not common lists with the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms.

During Wednesday's KK session, RZECZPOSPOLITA sounded out the union's activists about the meeting with the president that was held last week. The answers suggested that it was necessary. "It put an end to the misunderstandings that started at the last congress of the union," says Janusz Palubicki, leader of Wielkopolska [Poznan region] "S." "The president promised to set up a hotline telephone link to Minister [as published] Falandysz and to hold meetings more frequently. He also declared that he would take the union's opinion into account while making important decisions," Andrzej Steczynski recalls. The Elblag Region head believes that if Walesa keeps the above-mentioned promises, "S" will stand to benefit.

The aforementioned "S" leaders do not want, either officially or unofficially, to say whether the union will want to help Walesa get reelected. "It is too early for any declarations. We do not know how many candidates will run and how many opposing candidates there will be from the postsolidarity parties," says Palubicki. "Expressing official support for Walesa might lead to rifts within the union," Steczynski finally says. Smagowicz tells us to wait for the congress to issue its opinion, which will be at the end of September and the beginning of October.

Unionists are not certain whether "S" should get involved in the talks between postsolidarity groupings and parties, the goal of which is to agree on a common candidate for president.

"If the talks do not go well, the union should become a mediator," Andrzej Steczynski believes. According to Jacek Smagowicz, all agreements so far have been disadvantageous to "S." The union was looked upon as an instrument. Smagowicz recalls the Suchocka government.

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All of them agree on one thing: "S" should not field its own candidate in the forthcoming election. It was also decided that, for the time being, the campaign of collecting signatures under the citizens' draft constitution will be continued.

The government's plans to change the laws on trade unions, on the settlement of collective bargaining, and on organizations of employers are considered by "S" to be a provocation. "The most dangerous of these is the plan against the unions of employees. We will use all means and methods to defend employees' rights," the KK announced. The union demands that the price increases be stopped immediately and that the tax policy be corrected.

'Trade' Possible in Naming of Police Candidate

WS0809121194 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 8 Sep 94 p 1

[Article by "IRE" and "PS": "Pawlak Proposes a Trade: Minister for Commandant"]

[Text] Prime Minister Pawlak's new candidate for the post of police chief commandant will probably be Plock Voivodship Commandant Maciej Ksiazkiewicz. If the political advisory committee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW] and Internal Affairs Minister Andrzej Milczanowski approve of this candidacy, the prime minister will not recall Jerzy Zimowski, MSW under secretary of state, to replace him with a PSL politician, we learned unofficially on 7 September.

The prime minister's previous candidate, Leszek Lamparski (police chief in 1990 and 1991), is disqualified by his permanent physical disability. Inspector Boguslaw Strzelecki, who is now chief of police in Krakow and is supported by the MSW and the advisory committee, does not enjoy the prime minister's trust.

Several coalition politicians accuse the prime minister of delaying for too long a decision to recall Commandant Smolarek, as well as of being overly stubborn in his support of Lamparski.

As ZYCIE WARSZAWY learned on 7 September from a member of the MSW Political Advisory Committee, even a representative of the Polish Peasant Party in the committee backed Strzelecki and criticized the destructive behavior of the prime minister.

"The prime minister has not made any decision yet," ZYCIE WARSZAWY was told by Pawlak's Press Secretary Ewa Wachowicz, who was asked about the prime minister's plans concerning this issue.

Conflicts in Cabinet, Dispute With NBP Viewed

WS0809111594 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 8 Sep 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Agata Nowakowska, Dominika Wielowieyska, and Waldemark Kumor: "Conflicts Paralyze the Government; Strategy for Disintegration"]

[Excerpts] "There are too many conflicts in the government. Normalcy has its limits. I can understand two or three disputes, but here there are a whole lot of them. Something is wrong here." This is how Marek Borowski, deputy leader of the parliamentary club of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], yesterday evaluated the recent series of misunderstandings in the Pawlak government. "Right now a discussion is under way in government, but a compromise will be reached," Franciszek Stefaniuk, deputy leader of the parliamentary club of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], says calmly.

The government has recently been unable to fill the position of police chief commandant, carry out reform in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or change the principles of pensions valorization. Most importantly of all, it is still not able to reach agreement on the key laws for the "Strategy for Poland," prepared by Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko.

The government announced that the 14 bills introducing the "Strategy" would find their way to the Sejm in September. However, for a couple of weeks now, it has been "putting off discussion" of them. According to high-ranking officials in the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM], this in fact means that the ministers cannot make a final decision on whether to accept Kolokdo's proposals.

Last week, when the government was toiling its way through the bills for Kolodko's program, the deputy prime minister suggested that the work be continued until a result is achieved, even on Saturday and Sunday. "Well, on Saturday we are going to Jasna Gora [a place of religious pilgrimages in Czestochowa], and Sunday is a holy day," the PSL's Agriculture Minister Andrzej Smietanko allegedly replied.

Miller Won

On 6 September, the government adopted only one of the key bills—on the commercialization of state-owned enterprises. Reform of the economic center was again postponed.

In the absence of Kolodko, the Cabinet decided on the bill of pension valorization, which is strongly supported by Labor Minister Miller and which contradicts "Strategy." According to Miller, valorization based on wage, not price, increases will be in forces for another two years.

"Miller does not destroy the entire 'Strategy.' He has opposed the price-based valorization all along. Miller takes into account the expectations of pensioners and senior citizens, to whom the price valorization would be disadvantageous," believes SLD Press Spokesman Zbigniew Siemiatkowski.

"If 'Strategy' were chopped up and changed in such a way that it would be impossible to accomplish its fundamental goals, I would not be taken aback if Minister Kolodko did not want to remain in this post," says

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Borowski, who was responsible for the economy before Kolodko came on board and who resigned after the resounding conflict within the coalition earlier this year.

Kolodko's Peace

Yesterday, upon returning from Brussels, Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko minimized the conflict within the government. He told the television news program "Wiadomosci" that his "Strategy" does not specify that the price-based pension valorization is to be introduced early next year. He added that, as early as December, 11-percent valorization can be expected.

Kolodko sarcastically agreed with Prime Minister Pawlak that reform of the economic center needs to be given a second thought. "The prime minister knows what he is saying. There are many things in the 'Strategy' that need to be given a second thought."

The deputy prime minister added, however, that delaying this reform may impede the implementation of his program.

Franciszek Stefaniuk, deputy chairman of the PSL Parliamentary Club, does not associate the current friction within the government with the coalition crisis that ended in the resignation of Marek Borowski. He explains that the prime minister is trying to give a thought to every step he takes. "It is not so that Waldemar Pawlak is against reforms. He merely believes that, because the people supported quieter changes in the election, certain conclusions must be drawn from this," adds the PSL deputy. He admits that the stand taken by some SLD ministers is "strictly liberal" and that the PSL has "a slightly different attitude, and demands that the PSL's opinion be respected as well." Asked exactly which ministers he had in mind, he replied that he was "talking generally about the situation."

Government Versus National Bank of Poland [NBP]

In line with the "Strategy," next year one treasury ministry should be established instead of several economic ministries. In the meantime, Prime Minister Pawlak has started to speculate, in public, whether it would not be better to reform the ministry, and URM Chairman Michal Strak supports the idea of a separate treasury ministry and a privatization ministry. [passage omitted]

Pawlak Versus Milczanowski

The press is carrying a lot of articles about police corruption, about arrogant activities of various Mafia-like organizations that go unpunished, and, recently, about a terrorist "Gum Bear" in Krakow.

In the meantime, a conflict over the police chief is under way in the government. The prime minister is supporting, at any cost, Leszek Lamparski, who is a disabled pensioner (he already held this position between May 1990 and July 1991). Internal Affairs Minister Andrzej Milczanowski prefers Krakow Police Commandant Boguslaw Strzelecki. [passage omitted]

Milczanowski Versus Olechowski

A storm in the government was also caused by the unfortunate nomination of Marian Zacharski, a superspy of the Polish People's Republic, as head of the intelligence services. Minister Milczanowski signed the nomination and went on vacation.

After protests from, among others, Lech Walesa and the categorical demarche from Washington, Zacharski resigned.

Nevertheless, Milczanowski defended his decision some time after that. The decision was, however, very sharply criticized by Foreign Affairs Minister Andrzej Olechowski. He considered it to be a mistake with grave international consequences. He demanded that decisions related to Polish foreign policy be discussed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ].

Olechowski Versus Pawlak and Strak

There is also a conflict over the MSZ. Prime Minister Pawlak and URM Chairman Michal Strak are holding up the ministry's reform. The new MSZ statute (the first step in the reform process) has not been included on the agenda of the Council of Ministers for some time now. Therefore, the MSZ head withdrew the statute bill from URM and announced that he can reorganize the ministry by himself. "I can do anything except dividing the political and administrative functions," he explained.

Government Versus Bank

As though this were too little, the government almost started an open conflict with the NBP. The bank repays in kind and also criticizes the government.

Minister Koldko declares that he is "in favor of total independence of the central bank." However, the government would like to exert influence on the bank's decisions concerning financial policy and the budget: the degree of financing the budget deficit or the size of interest rates.

NBP Vice President Witold Kozinski said on 6 September that the bank "is ready to abandon part of its autonomy," but its priority will always be "combating inflation, not the current needs of the budget." The NBP has for some time now been undermining the main points of next year's budget. According to the bank, it is impossible to reduce inflation to 16 percent in 1995.

The NBP warned on 7 September that, if the government introduced some other price increases, inflation would be 3 to 4 percent higher than planned by the government. It is high inflation that makes it impossible to lower interest rates—which the government wants.

Minister Kolodko for a long time defended his opinion that the NBP should provide 30 trillion zlotys [Z] to

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cover part of the deficit. The bank agrees to pay only approximately Z15-20 trillion. As we have unofficially found out, the government finally accepted the bank's proposal.

Observers say that, in return for this, the NBP will "give away part of its independence." The government initiated the amendment of the law on the NBP. In line with the amended version of the law, a council would be set up in the NBP that would exert influence on decisions made by the bank. It would consist of representatives of parliament and political parties.

Minister Leszek Miller said on 6 September on the Third Program of Polish Radio that the goal of this chance is "increasing social control over the decisions made by the bank." Representatives of the bank say openly that the "idea of setting up the council" is an answer to the bank's rigorous anti-inflationary policies. "Such a change might result in subordinating financial policy to the fiance minister and to the needs of the budget, which would be a surprising solution in a free market economy," Vice President Kozinski says.

For the time being, Pawlak has not commented on the dispute between the NBP and the Finance Ministry. We have learned unofficially that Pawlak asked the NBP to prepare, independently of the Finance Ministry, its own version of the main points of next year's budget. "Does Pawlak not really believe Kolodko?" Such a question is asked in both the ministry and the NBP.

Text of Treaty With Lithuania Published

94EP0084A Vilnius ZNAD WILII in Polish VI, 16-31 May 94 No 10 pp 4-5

[Text of Treaty Between the Republic of Lithuania and the Republic of Poland Governing Friendly Relations and Neighborly Cooperation]

[Text] The Republic of Lithuania and the Republic of Poland, hereinafter referred to as the contracting parties:

—Whereas they guide themselves by the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Paris Charter of the New Europe, and documents of multilateral all-European cooperation;

—Whereas they aspire to make their own contribution to the integration of Europe and are aware of the commonalty of their interests and of their shared responsibility for peace, security, understanding, and cooperation in a democratic and free Europe that respects the rights of man;

—Whereas they appreciate the importance of Polish-Lithuanian relations to the whole of cooperation in Central Europe, in the Baltic region, and on the entire European Continent and declare the will to cooperate on the bilateral plane as well as within the framework of international organizations and institutions and also with the object of promoting broad cooperation in the Baltic region;

—Whereas they are mindful of the complexity of the history of our nations and the centuries' long closeness between Lithuanians and Poles, on taking into consideration the possibilities for differing interpretations of their common history by both nations;

—Whereas they emphasize that awareness of good and bad pages in the annals of our countries is to serve the strengthening of mutual understanding between the Lithuanian and Polish nations in a democratic Europe that is uniting itself;

—Whereas they express their regret about the conflicts that had arisen between the two countries following World War I when, after their prolonged enslavement, Lithuanians and Poles began to build a new life under national sovereignty and condemn the resort to force that had sometimes happened in the relations between the two nations;

—Whereas they feel distressed by the tragedy and hugeness of the losses suffered by our nations owing to the 20th-century totalitarian systems;

—Whereas they solemnly affirm mutual integrity, now and for the future, of our current territories with capitals in Vilnius and Warsaw, regardless of the course of their national boundaries in the past;

—Whereas they allow for the fact that the Lithuanians and Poles living for centuries on the territory of both countries have made and continue to make lasting contributions to the culture of both nations and states as well as to the growth of European culture;

—Whereas they are aware that the recovery of national independence by both states and nations imposes on us the duty of bold thinking about the future;

—Whereas they aspire toward broad development of mutual relations and friendly cooperation based on the good-neighbor principle, the parties have agreed upon the following:

Article 1. The contracting parties cultivate their mutual relations in the spirit of mutual respect, trust, equality, and good-neighborliness, basing themselves on the primacy of international law and especially on the principles of respect for national sovereignty, inviolability of boundaries, prohibition against armed aggression, territorial integrity, noninterference in domestic affairs, and adherence to the rights of man and basic liberties.

Article 2.1. The contracting parties acknowledge as inviolable the national boundary existing and running between them and pledge themselves to respect absolutely each other's national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

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2.2. The parties affirm that they entertain no territorial claims toward one another and shall not entertain any such claims in the future.

Article 3.1. Pursuant to the United Nations Charter and the appropriate documents of the CSCE, the contracting parties pledge themselves to resolve mutual disputes solely by peaceful means and affirm that they shall refrain from resorting to force or to the threat of resorting thereto in their mutual relations.

3.2. Neither of the parties shall allow its territory to be used by a third country or third countries with the object of perpetrating an act of aggression against the other party.

3.3. Both parties affirm that the activities of their armed forces on their territories shall be consonant with the United Nations Charter, the Final Act of the CSCE, the Paris Charter of New Europe, and other documents of the CSCE.

Article 4.1. Pursuant to the provisions of the appropriate documents of the CSCE, the contracting parties shall cooperate, with the object of maintaining and strengthening security on the European Continent.

4.2. The parties shall translate into reality agreed-upon all-European measures to strengthen trust and security. As the need arises, the parties shall agree upon additional measures of this kind.

4.3. The parties shall pay special attention to aspects of strengthening security and the means of trust in the Baltic region.

Article 5.1. The contracting parties shall actively support the process of nuclear, chemical, and biological disarmament. The parties believe that arms reduction to the level of indispensable sufficiency for defense and the implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty will result in consolidating stability and security in Europe.

5.2. In accordance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the parties shall cooperate to prevent the proliferation of such arms throughout the world and, in particular, in Central and East Europe.

5.3. The parties shall take steps to assure control over the exports of goods and technologies that serve peaceful purposes but may be utilized in producing the arms referred to in Paragraphs 1 and 2.

5.4. The parties shall base their other mutual military relations on separate agreements.

Article 6.1. In the event there arise disputes or situations that, in the opinion of either of the contracting parties, may endanger or are endangering the maintenance of peace or security in the world or disturb international tranquility or security, and, in particular, when such disputes or situations concern the security of both parties, the parties shall immediately conduct suitable mutual consultations with the object of exploring possible means of resolving the dispute or situation in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

6.2. In the event that a third country or third countries execute an armed attack against either of the parties, the other party pledges itself not to grant any assistance or support whatsoever to the attacking country or countries throughout the duration of the armed conflict, and it shall be active in resolving the conflict in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the documents of the CSCE.

Article 7. Within the framework of the Baltic Council and other organizations and institutions of the Baltic region, the contracting parties shall create conditions promoting the growth of cooperation and good-neighborliness in that part of Europe.

Article 8.1. The contracting parties shall develop regular contacts between their government institutions. In particular, they shall create favorable conditions for the growth of interparliamentary cooperation.

8.2. Meetings between the heads of state and governments shall, as a rule, take place annually as well as whenever the parties deem it pertinent.

8.3. The ministers of foreign affairs shall hold regular consultations on matters of interest to both parties.

8.4. As the need arises, the parties may, as mutually agreed to, appoint bilateral commissions with the object of resolving issues of mutual interest.

Article 9.1. The contracting parties shall promote the growth of mutually advantageous economic cooperation, inclusive of commercial cooperation based on market principles, and they shall assure the proper conditions for such cooperation, with allowance for the protection of investments, technologies, patent rights, and copyrights. Furthermore, they shall enact appropriate laws governing the flow of capital, labor, goods, and services.

9.2. The parties shall facilitate the growth of cooperation between state and private enterprises as well as other economic entities. In particular, they shall promote the growth of cooperation in investment and capital between Lithuanian and Polish enterprises, and, to this end, they shall use all of the available means of promoting said cooperation. Special attention shall be paid to cooperation between small and medium-sized enterprises.

9.3. The parties shall exchange experience and engage in mutual assistance in training and other aspects in the course of building and refining a market economy.

9.4. The parties shall develop and facilitate their scientific and technical cooperation for peaceful uses on the principle of equality and mutual advantage, with allowance for the potential of modern science and technology.

Article 10.1. The contracting parties attach great importance to mutually advantageous cooperation between

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townships, cities, and other administrative-territorial units and regions, in particular in the border areas. The parties shall facilitate and support this cooperation in all domains, both in their mutual relations and through participation in the Baltic Council and the Union of Baltic Cities.

10.2. In the cooperation referred to in Paragraph 1, the parties guide themselves by the appropriate conventions of the Council of Europe. The parties shall strive to extend this cooperation to the activities of the appropriate European institutions.

10.3. The parties shall appoint the bilateral Commission for Cross-Border Cooperation. A suitable agreement shall be concluded for this purpose.

10.4. The parties shall increase the number of border crossings, modernize the existing crossings and the related access roads, and take steps to streamline and accelerate, on the principle of reciprocity, customs and border clearances as well as to further develop cooperation between the appropriate administrative agencies.

10.5. The parties agree that, given the ongoing integration of Europe, it is necessary to coordinate the policies of individual states on land use and management, in particular between contiguous countries.

Article 11.1. The contracting parties shall cooperate to improve mutual and transit routes of communication and the attendant infrastructure in all domains of transportation, inclusive of pipeline transportation and power lines.

11.2. The parties shall take steps to modernize and improve telecommunications links—in particular, telephone and telex links and mutual electronic data transmission.

11.3. The parties shall promote cooperation in transportation and communications in both Europe and other parts of the world. Their appropriate agencies shall conclude separate agreements in that respect, as based on international standards and norms.

Article 12.1. The contracting parties shall cooperate in environmental protection and rational exploitation of natural resources with the object of assuring mutual and lasting ecological security. They shall develop, support, and create the conditions for improving and consolidating quality environment—in particular, waters, air, soil, and forests—as well as for protecting the fauna and flora, especially in border areas. The parties shall take preventive measures to avoid cross-border pollution, especially chemical and radioactive pollution, and shall aim toward effective restriction and elimination of pollution. They shall also cooperate in applying and developing ecologically pure manufacturing processes and technologies.

12.2. The parties shall warn each other about possible environmental pollution on the territory of either party and cooperate and assist each other in preventing and combating ecological threats in border areas.

12.3. The parties shall participate in establishing coordinated cooperation in and strategy for protecting the environment in the region, in Europe, and in the world.

12.4. The appropriate agencies of both parties shall conclude specific agreements on ecological security and cooperation in accordance with international standards.

Article 13.1. The contracting parties pledge themselves to respect international principles and standards concerning the protection of the rights of national minorities, in particular the related provisions of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, the International Pacts on the Rights of Man, the appropriate documents of the CSCE, and the European Convention on Protecting the Rights of Man and Fundamental Liberties, along with Additional Protocols adopted by both parties.

13.2. People belonging to the Lithuanian minority in the Republic of Poland—that is, people who are Polish citizens of Lithuanian origin or who declare themselves as belonging to the Lithuanian nationality, culture, or tradition and who acknowledge the Lithuanian language as their mother language, as well as people belonging to the Polish minority in the Republic of Lithuania—that is, persons who are Lithuanian citizens of Polish origin or declare themselves as belonging to the Polish nationality, culture, or tradition and who acknowledge the Polish language as their mother language—have the right, individually or together with other members of their group, to freely express, preserve, and develop their national, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity without being in any way discriminated against, and to be treated equally before the law.

13.3. The parties affirm that belonging to a national minority is a matter of personal choice by the individual and that no adverse consequences may ensue therefrom to the individual. No one can be forced to prove or renounce his ethnic origin.

Article 14. The contracting parties declare that the people referred to in Article 13, Paragraph 2 have, in particular, the right to:

—Freely use of the language of the national minority in private and public life.

—Access information in that language, its dissemination and exchange, and personal ownership of mass media.

—Learn the language of their national minority and receive instruction in that language.

—Establish and operate, in consonance with domestic laws, their own institutions, organizations, or associations—in particular, cultural, religious, and educational ones, inclusive of schools at all levels of instruction, which may recruit voluntary financial and other contributions domestically and abroad as well as

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public assistance and participate in international nongovernmental organizations.

—Profess and practice their religion, inclusive of the acquisition, ownership, and use of religious paraphernalia and the conduct of educational religious activities in the language of the national minority.

—Establish and maintain undisturbed contacts with each other within the national territory as well as abroad with citizens of other countries to whom they are linked by a common ethnic origin.

—Use their names and surnames as pronounced in the language of the national minority. Detailed guidelines concerning the spelling of such names and surnames shall be specified in a separate agreement.

—Participate in public life directly or through the mediation of freely elected representatives to the national government and local governments, and have access to public service on equal terms with other citizens.

Article 15. The contracting parties shall, on their territory, protect the national, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of the people referred to in Article 13, Paragraph 2, and they shall create the conditions for its development. In particular, the parties shall:

—Consider allowing the use of the languages of the national minorities in government offices, especially in those administrative districts in which a national minority accounts for a substantial part of the population.

—Assure for national minorities access to means of public mass transit.

—Assure adequate possibilities for teaching the language of the national minority and for instruction in that language at preschools, elementary schools, and secondary schools.

—Take necessary steps to protect the identity of the national minority upon appropriate consultation, including contacts with organizations or associations of the groups referred to in Article 13, Paragraph 2.

—Take into consideration the history and culture of the groups referred to in Article 13, Paragraph 2 in connection with the teaching of history at educational institutions.

—Refrain from any actions that may result in the assimilation of members of a national minority against their wishes. Furthermore, in accordance with international standards, the parties shall refrain from any actions that might lead to changes in the proportions of national minorities in the areas in which they reside.

Article 16.1. No provision contained in Article 14 may be interpreted as justifying any actions or activities that may conflict with the United Nations Charter, the principles of international law, and, especially, the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of a state and the documents of the CSCE.

16.2. Any person who belongs to the Lithuanian national minority in the Republic of Poland or to the Polish national minority in the Republic of Lithuania should be, like any other citizen, loyal to the country of his domicile and guide himself by the obligations ensuing from the laws of that country.

Article 17. The contracting parties guarantee to people who reside permanently on either party's territory but are citizens of the other party all of the rights of man granted to such people in accordance with universally recognized principles and specific norms of international law as well as the laws of the country in which these people maintain a permanent domicile.

Article 18.1. The contracting parties shall surround with special care the cultural landmarks and treasures present on either party's territory that reflect historical events and cultural and scientific accomplishments and traditions of the other party, and they shall promote dissemination of the related knowledge and assure suitable legal, material, and other protection. Furthermore, they shall assure unrestricted access to these landmarks and treasures and to the related information or make sure that this access is provided in cases when this is not a vested power of the government.

18.2. Either party shall take care to search for, identify, and return cultural treasures removed from the territory of the other party in violation of international norms.

18.3. The parties shall appoint special representatives to assure the implementation of the objectives specified in Paragraphs 1 and 2.

Article 19.1. The contracting parties shall promote the development of cooperation between schools and universities at various levels as well as between research institutes, through the exchange of students and stipend recipients.

19.2. Either party shall accept as valid academic credits and degrees granted at schools and universities of the other party.

Article 20.1. The contracting parties affirm their commitment to providing all interested people with reciprocal access to their language and culture, and they shall support corresponding governmental and private initiatives and institutions.

20.2. The parties shall support reciprocal dissemination of their national literatures in both the original language and in translation.

20.3. The parties are in favor of expanding the possibilities for reciprocal teaching of their national languages at schools, universities, and other educational institutions.

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In addition, they shall take steps to expand the possibilities for the reciprocal provision of Lithuanistic and Polonistic studies at their universities.

20.4. The parties shall cooperate in delegating academic teachers and researchers in their professional and academic training and advanced training, and in reciprocal provision of scientific assistance.

20.5. The parties shall support the activities of joint commissions on school textbooks.

Article 21.1. Each contracting party shall strive to facilitate the dissemination of the other party's press, books, and audiovisual broadcasts. The parties shall develop their cooperation in radio and television broadcasting as well as between press agencies, thus contributing to the provision of objective and exhaustive reciprocal information in life in both countries. Detailed conditions for such cooperation will be defined in a separate agreement.

21.2. To propagate national accomplishments and achievements in culture, science, and education and to support their cooperation in these domains, the parties shall establish cultural and information centers—a Lithuanian one in Poland and a Polish one in Lithuania.

21.3. The parties shall support the development of contacts between citizens of both parties, as well as of cooperation between social organizations, political parties, trade unions, churches and religious denominations, sports organizations, foundations, and other organizations and associations in both countries.

21.4. In view of the special role of the rising generation in shaping mutual relations and understanding between the nations of both countries, the governments of the Republic of Lithuania and the Republic of Poland shall conclude an agreement on cooperation and youth exchange.

Article 22.1. The contracting parties shall support broad cooperation in health care and sanitation, especially as regards the prevention and control of civilization-related and contagious diseases.

22.2. The parties shall strive for close cooperation in the domain of labor relations, insurance, and social care.

Article 23.1. Each contracting party pledges itself to preserve, provide legal protection for, and maintain in accordance with international law and national and religious customs military and civilian cemeteries, graves, and sites of burial along with monuments, as well as other sites and landmarks, whether currently existing or discovered in the future on the party's territory, insofar as they are the object of reverence and commemoration by citizens of the other party.

23.2. Citizens of either party shall be assured of access to and the possibility of caring for graves, cemeteries, and burial and memorial sites commemorating their compatriots on the territory of the other party.

23.3. Each party shall cooperate with the other in identifying and registering sites of burials of citizens of the other party on its territory.

Article 24.1. The contracting parties shall create, on the basis of separate agreements, the conditions for reciprocal legal handling of cases bearing on civil, family, criminal, and administrative laws.

24.2. The parties shall cooperate in fighting organized crime, terrorism, economic crime, illegal drug trafficking, illegal trafficking in works of art, violations of the safety of civilian air and sea traffic, the manufacture and distribution of counterfeit legal tenders, and illegal immigration.

Article 25. The present treaty does not violate the rights and obligations defined in the bilateral and multilateral agreements concluded by each contracting party with other countries.

Article 26. The present treaty shall be registered with the United Nations Secretariat in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

Article 27.1. The present treaty is subject to ratification and will take effect on the day the ratification documents are exchanged.

27.2. The present treaty is concluded for a period of 15 years. Subsequently, its validity is automatically extended for five-year periods, unless either party renounces it by giving notice at least a year before the expiration date. The treaty was concluded in Vilnius on 26 April 1994 and prepared in two copies, each in the Lithuanian and Polish languages, with both texts being equally valid.

On behalf of the Lithuanian Republic: Algirdas Brazauskas
On behalf of the Polish Republic: Lech Walesa

State of Sugar Industry Reviewed

94EP0085B Warsaw GAZETA PRZEMYSLOWA I HANDLOWA in Polish No 20, 26 Jul 94 p 3

[Article by Anna Karska: "The Not-So-Sweet Situation of the Sugar Industry"]

[Text] The current parliamentary work on new regulations concerning the sugar industry offers a good occasion to present the difficult situation of that industry.

It is estimated that some 2 million people are connected with the sugar industry: planters, refinery workers, and the employees of institutions and enterprises working closely with the sugar industry.

One should point out here the close links between the sugar industry and agriculture, as a result of which the former is regarded as a typical agricultural industry, with the typical characteristics of the latter, such as seasonal

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production. This requires purchasing, organizing, and processing into sugar all of the beets that are supplied in a short period of time.

It is estimated that the general economic situation of enterprises in that industry has constantly worsened since roughly 1991. In 1990, the industry was divided up, and 76 enterprises were created. Before the start of the 1993-94 processing season, 25 of these, including the largest and most modern refineries (such as Glinojeck) had no credit ability. This is not, however, the result of their inefficiency. The problem is that some of them took out loans and built up their production capacity significantly in the late 1980's, and, as a result, fell into the well-known debt trap. In this situation, their present profitability is not an indicator of their real capabilities because the interest on the above-mentioned loans, which, if debt reduction were to occur, would naturally cease to be a problem and thus change their profitability decisively for the better, makes up a significant part of these firms' costs.

For just these reasons, these firms could begin the processing season only by gaining the permission of beet planters to spread out payment for the raw materials supplied. Those debts have so far not been paid in full. This is because many sugar industry firms must sell sugar at prices lower than the costs of production in order to get money to take care of the most urgent debts. The sugar industry's financial crisis has also led to a slowing of the modernization process.

It must also be noted that the technological gap between the domestic and the West European sugar industries is generally widening. This delays the adaptation of that sector to the conditions of integration with the European Union. One encounters the opinion that only with new structural and legal solutions can there be such a restructuring process that would make the Polish sugar industry a strong economic sector, capable of competing with comparable economic structures in the European Union.

For the same reason, it is felt that an improvement of the economic situation of the sugar industry, under present conditions, can be achieved only through the introduction of complex and systemic legal regulations dealing with the organization and the restructuring of the sugar industry and the production and turnover of sugar in domestic and foreign markets. One condition, however, is that the sugar industry become part of the world production and commerce cycle.

The work currently going on in parliament is intended to make it possible to guarantee to all parties involved in sugar production in this country:

1) Payment of the debts of bankrupting refineries by extrabudgetary means.

2) Initiation of the Polish sugar industry into the world production and commerce cycle, without resorting to interventionary subsidies by the state.

3) Development of export.

4) For many refineries, the recovery of credit ability and the avoidance of bankruptcy.

5) Restructuring through elimination of those units engaged in the most costly production.

6) Improved efficiency through the introduction of latest generation technology.

The means to accomplish these goals are provided by the regulations concerning:

—The establishment of a yearly maximum production of sugar destined for the domestic market (so-called quota A).

—The establishment of a maximum amount of sugar that would be destined for export, with the use of subsidies (quota B).

—The establishment of a maximum amount of sugar that could be introduced into commercial circulation on the domestic market in one quarter.

The idea, then, is for the Council of Ministers to impose limits on domestic production by setting yearly sugar production quotas by decree, based on decisions of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Economy. These quotas would be set by 1 August of the year preceding a sugar-processing season. Such limitations of sugar production, based on currently observed tendencies toward decline of sugar consumption in Poland, might in turn bring about a decline in sown acreage of sugar beets.

In the opinion of both the government and the Sejm, a solution to the problems of state sugar refineries might be to transform them into single-owner corporations of the State Treasury, in which 60 percent of the shares would be brought into four sugar companies created by the Ministry of Privatization. These would be:

1) The Silesian Sugar Company, in which there would be shares of single-owner corporations of the State Treasury created from 18 refineries.

2) The Poznan-Pomorze Sugar Company, in which there would be shares of single-owner corporations of the State Treasury created from 16 refineries.

3) The Mazowsze-Kujawy Sugar Company, in which there would be shares of single-owner corporations of the State Treasury created from 17 refineries; the shares of two other single-owner corporations of the State Treasury would also be included: the Glinojeck Refinery Corp. and the Chelmza Refinery Corp.

4) The Lublin Sugar Company, in which there would be shares of single-owner corporations of the State Treasury created from 14 refineries; the shares of two other single-owner corporations of the State Treasury would also be included: the Krasnystaw Refinery Corp. and the Lublin Refinery Corp.

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In the next stage of ownership transformation in the sugar industry, the newly created companies would undergo the privatization process.

According to the plan, the workers of state enterprises transformed into companies and sugar beet planters who have contract agreements with those enterprises would have the right to acquire shares of those companies on favorable conditions, in accordance with the regulations of the law on privatization of state enterprises. Such preferential shares could not be sold before three years had passed since their acquisition.

Besides the above-mentioned companies, six previously privatized sugar refineries would also be active on the Polish sugar market.

Sugar refineries that are currently in a difficult financial situation would be able, after joining a company, to regain their credit ability. This would not cause a worsening of the company's financial situation. A company including a large number of refineries would be a trustworthy partner for the banks.

The plan would also introduce fees that parties acquiring sugar from producers would pay in certain situations; the income from these fees would go to finance sugar export.

During a transition period (until 30 September 1995), a minimum sale price of sugar would be introduced on the domestic market. This would be set by the Council of Ministers. The introduction of a minimum price would help to limit the fluctuations in the price of sugar on the domestic market and would improve the profitability of sugar refineries.

Will the plan presented here affect the present "not-so-sweet" situation of the domestic sugar industry, and, if so, by how much? One must trust that this is a rational plan that takes into account the present situation of the sugar sector. The fact that people from that sector themselves have worked on this plan for some time is not without significance.

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France's Juppe Visits, Confers With Leaders

Talks With Melescanu

AU0809134494 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Doina Saiciuc report]

[Text] French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe arrived in Romania today. This afternoon, before Juppe's official visit to Romania started, Bucharest was assessing that the Franco-Romanian relations have a special role and meaning. Five hours ago, at the beginning of talks with Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu, the head of French diplomacy declared that Paris also has a special interest in relations with Romania.

The two foreign ministers thus began official talks, which lasted over one hour, with very clear statements. For the Romanian side, the visit is part of the traditional ties that reflect the special and permanent quality of the bilateral relations.

The Romanian foreign minister, as he also said on the eve of his French counterpart's visit, stressed our country's interest in a more active French presence in Romania's economic and commercial life and in Romanian investments.

The French side favorably received the Romanian side's proposal to establish a Franco-Romanian Economic Council of Businessmen to stimulate economic and commercial exchanges.

The French side also agreed to examine the possibility of including Romania into a lower risk section in the French Committee for Ensuring Exports Credits, which protects French investments abroad. Likewise, the sides examined possibilities for financial arrangements between the two countries.

The Bucharest talks also broached the importance of cultural aspects of the bilateral relations.

Regarding the consular field, the Romanian side requested the French side to examine the possibility of making Romanian diplomatic and official passports exempt from visas, and in general, facilitating the procedure for granting visa to Romanian citizens, also within the framework of single visa for the European Union countries.

The Romanian side requested and the French side confirmed support for our country regarding its request to obtain the status of partner experiencing transition in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Certainly, considering that it is a French initiative, the stability pact was also broached during the political dialogue in Bucharest.

At the request of the head of French diplomacy, the Romanian foreign minister briefly described the results of his visit to Budapest. At the end of talks with his Romanian counterpart. Mr. Juppe said: If Romania and Hungary decide to sign the basic political treaty, I will be glad to salute the development of such relations, and I hope that this treaty will be an integral part of the stability pact.

Certainly, a first round of talks was held on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Mr. Juppe explained the latest developments within the contact group and the position of France and the European Union presented today at the experts' meeting in Berlin.

At the end of talks with Foreign Minister Melescanu, Mr. Juppe said: We have decided to establish regular meetings to exchange views, become increasingly familiar with each other, and work together equally in the cultural and linguistic areas, aspects that France greatly supports. As is know, from this point of view, there are relations between us that we have to develop further. In conclusion, from an economic viewpoint I believe—and I think this is also Mr. Melescanu's viewpoint—that the French presence in the Romanian economy is not sufficient. We have to think of ways to develop this aspect.

Confers With Opposition

AU0809204994 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 8 Sep 94

[Text] French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe met with the representatives of the opposition parties at the French Embassy in Bucharest this morning. The guest wanted to find out the opinions of the opposition leaders regarding current aspects of Romanian policy, the situation of democratic institutions in our country, and the stage of reform in Romania. The discussions held during the meeting highlighted various aspects pertaining to the current economic and social situation and the opposition's proposals regarding the Romanian-French relations, particularly in the economic field.

The meeting was attended by Mr. Emil Constantinescu, president of the Democratic Convention [CDR]; Mr. Ion Diaconescu, from the National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party [PNTCD]; Nicolae Manolescu, from the Civic Alliance Party [PAC]; Bela Marko, from the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR]; Sergiu Cunescu, from the Social Democratic Party of Romania [PSDR]; and Daniela Crasnaru, from the Liberal Party-1993 [PL'93]. According to ROMPRES, aside from the leaders of the parties belonging to the CDR, Messrs. Petre Roman, president of the Democratic Party [PD], and Mircea Ionescu-Quintus, president of the National Liberal Party [PNL] were also invited to participate in the talks.

At the end of the meeting that took place at the French Embassy in Bucharest, Messrs. Petre Roman, PD president, and Emil Constantinescu, CDR president, made exclusive brief statements to our radio station, in that order.

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Mr. Juppe also wanted to learn the opposition's opinion about the political situation, the state of the democratic institutions, and the functioning of democracy in our country, Mr. Roman said adding that the opposition took a critical stand vis-a-vis these problems and made several proposals related to developing the cooperation ties between Romania and France. Assessing the talk as useful, Mr. Petre Roman expressed the conviction that the big projects, particularly the economic ones, that can develop between the two countries must proceed from knowledge of Romanian realities.

In his turn, Mr. Emil Constantinescu said that the meeting offered an opportunity for an sincere and complete exchange of views on relations between the two nations, and on the way in which the domestic and foreign policies of Romania and France lend support to these relations. Placing national interests ahead of party interests, the CDR reiterated its full endorsement for the efforts to bring about Romania's European and Euro-Atlantic integration and pointed out the need to achieve stability at the social and ethnic level and develop regional cooperation, Mr. Emil Constantinescu said. In conclusion, he said that the ties with France, as with bilateral ties with both France and Germany, will play an important role in the future process of our country's European integration process.

Assesses Visit

AU0809205194 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 8 Sep 94

[Text] French Foreign Minister Mr. Alain Juppe concluded his two-day visit to Romania's capital city with a news conference. At the end of a series of contacts with Romanian President Ion Iliescu, Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu, and head of Romanian diplomacy Teodor Melescanu, Mr. Juppe called his visit to Romania extremely fruitful. The three primary messages I have brought to Bucharest, Mr. Juppe said, have to do with: the privileged relations of solidarity existing between France and Romania, with emphasis on the cultural, linguistic, and historical traditions; the equal chance of access to the European Union, which France believes that Romania should also have, along with all other European countries; and the need to set up a bilateral forum for developing economic ties. France wants to regain its place in the chart of foreign investors of Romania.

Referring to the situation in former Yugoslavia, the French foreign minister stressed that a political solution imposed by the international community, primarily through the peace plan of the Contact Group, would stand to gain quite a lot if it were also to benefit from the contribution of the countries neighboring on Yugoslavia. Regarding the compensations for the losses incurred by these countries, due to the implementation of the embargo against Yugoslavia, the head of the French diplomacy reminded these present of the stance according to which, after the effective cessation of the causes that have led to this embargo, France believes that requests for compensation may be taken into consideration.

Mr. Teodor Melescanu considered that one of the significant aspects of this visit is the continuity and importance attached by the two sides to the bilateral dialogue in the political, economic, and cultural spheres. He declared himself very satisfied with the results of the talks.

Holds News Conference

AU0809163694 Paris AFP in English 1522 GMT 8 Sep 94

[Text] Bucharest, Sept 8 (AFP)—UN sanctions against Belgrade could be eased after its decision to allow international observers to monitor its embargo against the Bosnian Serbs, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said Thursday.

"In so far as decisions taken by Belgrade against the Bosnian Serbs are maintained and effectively applied, we could begin progressively easing the sanctions," Juppe said.

Speaking during a press conference at the end of his two-day visit to the Bulgarian capital, he added: "The first step could be taken in coming weeks."

Earlier in Paris, French Foreign Ministry Spokesman Richard Duque said Serbia had agreed to accept the presence of non-military observers to monitor its embargo on Serb forces in Bosnia.

Duque said the observers would fall within the framework of a "humanitarian international mission."

Juppe indicated the observers could be representatives from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

He did not elaborate on when the observers would be deployed.

He said the mission's goal would be to "observe what is happening" and not to control the border between Serbia and the self-declared Bosnian Serb Republic.

Belgrade initially had balked at demands by western members of the international contact group on Bosnia-Herzegovina for observers to be deployed along the border.

But the group had warned that it would oppose the lifting of sanctions until Belgrade reconsidred its position on the matter.

Juppe's announcement came following a meeting in Berlin of the group, made up of Britain, France, Germany, the United States and Russia.

He said international mediators David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg "informed the group of an agreement in

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principle by the Belgrade authorities for the installation of an observation mechanism to ensure that the embargo is being respected."

"Mr. Owen and Mr. Stoltenberg will determine, in accord with Belgrade, the details of the monitoring operation, which will not be military in nature and will not implement checks but will observe what happens, having recourse to this or that international organization."

Article Criticizes Anti-Corruption Report

AU0909075294 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 6 Sep 94 p 3

[Article by Bogdan Burileanu: "Corruption Is at Home in the Parliament"]

[Excerpts] The pending discussion by the joint parliament chambers on a report drawn up by the Anti-Corruption Commission comes at a most "convenient" moment. It took a long time to prepare that report and the equivocal (at best) conclusions of the members of the governmental coalition will be swallowed by their colleagues from the same camp as nicely packaged, but particularly inoffensive, candies. As for the other camp (the minority democratic opposition), any arguments it may have against the report's falsified conclusions will be to no avail, as the opposition will be as helpless as on other occasions, given the quantitative (numerical) superiority of the ruling power, which—at the risk of disagreeing with the Marxist dialectics—will never transform itself into anything else.

The Vonica report—named after the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] senator who sponsored it—basically affirms one thing, namely, that there is corruption, but no corrupt people—at least not at the level of the power. [passage omitted] As a matter of fact, the so-called "Anti-Corruption" Commission is designed to hamper—under the anemic cover of parliamentary democracy—the uncovering of thefts, heists, and other shoddy deals through which the political power's people have also managed to lay hold of economic power. [passage omitted] The best example is the Caritas affair, backed by a fraudulent parliamentary party like the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR], which has now joined the government and is, not unskillfully, mimicking the efforts to throw light on the sinuous meanderings of corruption. [passage omitted]

Anthrax Epidemic Reported in Danube Delta Area

94P21150A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 3 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by Nicolae Militaru: "Anthrax Epidemic in the Delta"]

[Excerpts] Recently, about 60 animals, sheep and cattle, located in pastures in Pardina, Somona, and Cetarchioi communes in Tulcea County, died as a result of being contaminated by anthrax. [passage omitted] The two owners of the animals were supposed to present the animals for health and veterinary medicine examinations but they did not do so. In addition, it appears that the contaminated animals were slaughtered and the infested meat was consumed. Eight persons, including one of the owners, who consumed the meat of these animals, were hospitalized in the Tulcea hospital. The health and veterinary medicine police have confiscated 45 sheep carcasses in the "Union" and "Delta" storehouses in Tulcea. [passage omitted] Let us remind our readers that, about 10 days ago, a case of anthrax was noted in a commune in Dambovita County—after a 40-year absence from the area.

Cases Reported in Vaslui

94P21151A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 6-7 Aug 94 p 10

[Unattributed article: "The Anthrax Epidemic Extends to Vaslui"]

[Text] Thousands of livestock grazing in the delta have died as a result of being infected with the anthrax virus. As we reported in an earlier issue of the newspaper, eight persons who consumed the meat of the contaminated animals have been hospitalized. We were recently informed that seven persons in Chilia Veche are in the hospital with the same diagnosis. Some 43 people have been treated at home. Signs of the epidemic have also appeared in Vaslui. Two persons who became ill after eating goat meat in Taranu Neculai in Hoceni have been hospitalized with anthrax. An additional 26 residents of the locality are suspected of having the disease and a quarantine has been declared.

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Serbs Enter Cazin by 'Smashing' UN Checkpoint

AU0909091994

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0800 GMT on 9 September in its regular 10-minute newscast carries several reports on the combat situation in the republic.

Zagreb correspondent Nada al-Isa reports that "the Cazin Krajina has been entered by seven Chetnik tanks, the 1st and 2d Banija Corps, and the remnants of the 6th corps of the Chetnik army. The Chetniks from the occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia forayed into the Cazin Krajina by smashing the checkpoint of the Ukrainian UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] battalion in [words indistinct] and the Bihac region. This information has been confirmed by the 5th Corps [of the B-H Army] in Bihac. The Chetniks also passed without any problems by the 3d French UNPROFOR battalion in the Bihac region, which did not do anything at all.

"The Chetnik attacks were also passively watched by the European observers, who indeed appear to have literally understood their role of only monitoring events. The Chetniks immediately launched strong attacks on the 5th Corps. However, the fighters of the 5th Corps managed to push them back in a strong counterattack, and the fighting subsided. UNPROFOR has not issued a statement on this yet."

Reporting on the situation in Breza, correspondent Edim Cabaragic says that "if you ask the residents of Breza, the Sarajevo security zone no longer exists for sure. How can it exist when Breza has been hit from within this zone with numerous projectiles of the highest caliber and the most destructive power. This is what happened last night on 8 September. From their positions in the region of Nabovici, which, by the way, is deep inside the exclusion zone, the Chetniks fired a multiple rocket launcher, targeting and Breza's residential area with several powerful projectiles of the Oganj type. I think that it superfluous to say that the target were only civilians and their homes. Shortly after that, the Chetniks fired a heavy howitzer on the same region from the same location. It is only thanks to the luck that there were no casualties. Material damage to civilian property is enormous.

"Although they directly witnessed this, UNPROFOR members are still pretending to be blind, deaf, and dumb. We wonder for how long. Judging by everything, the Sarajevo security zone and other zones in Bosnia-Herzegovina that are under the UN protection only exist as such on the paper."

Concluding his report, Camaragic says that "the morning in Breza is quiet."

A correspondent from the Press Center of the 3d Army Corps reports that "all lines of defense of the fighters of the 3d Corps were subjected to the Chetnik artillery yesterday. On the Tesanj part of the front, the aggressor once again tried to breach our lines in vain." A correspondent from the Information Service of the 1st Glorious Hill Brigade of Olovo reports that "on the Olovo part of the front the aggressor is continuing the intensive attacks with infantry weapons, and antiaircraft guns and antiaircraft machine guns. The attacks were particularly intensive in the (?Kozluh), Jelik, and Olovske Luke regions last night and overnight."

The correspondent says that "there were no casualties and that the lines of defense, as always, have remained impenetrable."

According to the studio announcer, "after defeats and unsuccessful infantry attacks, the aggressor has reduced its attacks with the exclusively long-range artillery on the free territory of (?Ilijas). We have reliable information that during the most recent attacks on our lines, six Chetniks were killed and two wounded. A significant amount of technical material has also been captured."

The studio announcer also says that "the Chetniks are not keeping still on the Sarajevo front either. In addition to provocative attacks with mortars, grenades, and light arms, the intensity of the movement of military vehicles is not abating. This was reported by the Information Service of the 1st Crops."

Missiles Fired at British Patrol Planes

AU0809182494 Paris AFP in English 1709 GMT 8 Sep 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Sept 8 (AFP)—Two British warplanes on patrol over Bosnia came under fire from one or more surface-to-air missiles Thursday but were not hit, the United Nations said.

The British Navy Harrier planes were patrolling over the northwest Bosnian region of Bihac when they were fired at but returned safely to the aircraft carrier Invincible in the Adriatic where they are based, UN spokesman Dacre Holloway.

The vertical-takeoff fighter planes were enforcing the UN-imposed flight-exclusion zone over Bosnia.

It was the first time since September 1992 that such missiles were fired at planes carrying out a military or humanitarian mission over Bosnia.

Holloway said he it was not immediately clear how many missiles were fired or who fired them.

The Bihac pocket of northwest Bosnia is currently the scene of fighting between Moslem-led government forces and Serb rebels.

In September 1992 an Italian C-130 transport plane carrying aid material was downed by a missile near Sarajevo. Its crew of four was killed and Italy pulled out of the humanitarian airlift into the Bosnian capital.

Another Harrier was shot down over Gorazde in eastern Bosnia in April by Serb antiaircraft fire. The pilot managed to eject.

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Serb Provocations Within Sarajevo Exclusion Zone

AU0809194694

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1700 GMT on 8 September carries in its regular 41-minute newscast several reports on the fighting in the republic.

Bihac correspondent Mirza Sadikovic reports that "in the afternoon, Karadzic's Chetniks somewhat toned down the intensity of their infantry attacks but stepped up artillery attacks. They used 82-mm and 120-mm mortars, antiaircraft weapons, and tanks. In the afternoon hours they resumed artillery attacks on the Bihac town center. The material damage is extensive and several people have been injured."

An unidentified correspondent reports on the situation in Olovo and says that "the aggressor's small arms and antiaircraft gun and machine gun provocations along the defense lines are not abating in intensity. Particularly fierce fire was opened in the region of Kremenjaca where the enemy used 82-mm mortars to shell the area. In the region of Olovske Luke the aggressor opened fierce fire from an M-84 machine gun and antiaircraft guns and machine guns. The enemy also fiercely shelled the defense lines using 60-mm and 82-mm mortars."

The studio announcer reads a report on the situation in Teocak and says that "the Chetniks continued their combat activity. Throughout the day, they used 82-mm and 120-mm mortars to shell civilian targets in Snjeznica and Jatikovac. More intense attacks were reported on the eastern part of the front. The aggressor from his stronghold in Cujkanovo Brdo fired several dozen shells at the civilian targets in Bilalic and the old part of Teocak. The forward defense lines were exposed to fierce antiaircraft gun and machinegun fire."

A correspondent from the 7-South Operative Group Press Center reports that "the enemy has not reconciled himself to the fact that he recently lost territory in the 7-South Operative Group theater of operations. The most intense activity of the past 24 hours was reported on our defense lines at Zmajevac, Husar, and Preliva. He used heavy howitzers, B-1 guns, 120-mm mortars, and Bofors. The shells also pounded residential areas around Husar, Zmajevac, and Omerovo Guvno, namely, Radusa, Djemilic, and Oras Planje. Last night and today the aggressor was intensively regrouping around Husar, while a column of vehicles was reported travelling from the village of Petlja to Visa Plane."

Zvornik correspondent Nijaz Banjanovic reports that "the Chetniks used long-range artillery to shell residential areas and the positions of the 206th Chivalrous Brigade. Using 155-mm howitzers, tanks, and 120-mm mortars they again pounded civilian targets in Nezuk, Sapna, Medjidja, and Godus. Our defense lines at Skakovica on the Mt. Majevica part of the front were also not spared."

The studio announcer cites a report by the 1st Corps Information Service and says that "the positions of the 1st Corps joint units on the defense lines of the Ilijas free territories were again the target of fierce artillery attacks. For over a month now the enemy from his strongholds in Kastice, Donja Korita, Medojevici, Stomorina, and Buljatovina—all within the 20 km exclusion zone—has been using all available artillery pieces, tanks, antiaircraft, and infantry weapons. However, our defense lines are strong and stable." She goes on to say that "the Chetniks around Sarajevo today intensified their activites compared to yesterday. Snipers from Cavrkova Stijena were particularly active. An antiaircraft machine gun from Zecja Glava fired at Hladivode and Gazin Han, leaving one person injured. A Chetnik antiaircraft gun was fired at Orahov Brijeg."

UN Reports Serbian Attack Near Sarajevo

AU0809162594 Paris AFP in English 1129 GMT 8 Sep 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Sept 8 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb forces appear to have launched an attack on strategic heights north of Sarajevo, a UN spokesman said Thursday [8 September], in what could be the start of attempts to cut government-held territory in two.

Commander Eric Chaperon said "unconfirmed reports suggest that the BSA (the Bosnian Serb Army) has started an attack towards the Cemerska Platina feature" some 30 kilometres (20 miles) from the Bosnian capital.

He said UN monitors were unable to provide more details as they were too far from the centre activity.

If confirmed the attack could mark the beginning of Serb attempts to recapture territory lost to the mainly-Moslem Bosnian army last month around Brugle.

It could also provide the launch pad to an attempt to cut off the government-held Tuzla region in northern Bosnia, in a pincer movement with Serb troops moving from the Brugle area and southwards from a Serb-held strip which juts down from Doboj.

By driving a wedge between Sarajevo and Tuzla—at a point where the government area is barely 30 kilometres wide—the Serbs would be in a stronger position to end the 29-month-old war to their advantage.

The Cemerska Platina heights lie to the south of the Tuzla-Sarajevo corridor.

Chaperon also reported a Bosnian army attack "of limited scope" towards the Bradinj feature southwest of Ribnica, at the northern limit of the corridor, after a break in the fighting there of several weeks.

He reported 190 detonations, small arms and heavy machine-gun fire in the area Tuesday.

Chaperon also pointed to a "significant increase" in military activity in the Olovo region, around a dozen kilometres east of Cemerska Platina, and another key battle ground.

Bosnian military strategy in the area consists of pushing east to secure heights overlooking the pre-war Tuzla-Sarajevo tarmac road, control of which would give the

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government an all-weather route along which it could supply Tuzla from the coast.

It would also enable the government to concentrate on capturing the Serb-held Ilijas areas north of Sarajevo, one of the keys to breaking the siege of the Bosnian capital.

UN Official Reports Sarajevo Airlift To Resume

AU0709171194 Paris AFP in English 1655 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Sept 7 (AFP)—The humanitarian aid airlift to Sarajevo is to resume Thursday after a day-long suspension sparked by the discovery of bullet holes in two UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] aircraft, a UN aid official said.

Peter Kessler, spokesman for the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], said the flights would resume "first thing in the morning" (Thursday).

The flights were temporarily halted following the discovery by maintenance crews of bullet holes in two UNPROFOR aircraft after they had safely landed in the Croatian capital Zagreb.

The two craft were hit in separate incidents Monday and Tuesday, said Kessler, a report confirmed by UNPROFOR spokesman Major Dacre Holloway.

A top-level meeting of the five nations who assure the airlift operation—Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and the United States—agreed Wednesday to go ahead with the relief flights because UNHCR planes had not been targetted in the incidents.

Holloway said there was "absolutely no indication whatsoever" of who was responsible for the attacks "because we don't know when it happened."

The airlift only resumed on August 22 after being open only five of the previous 31 days.

Kessler said the latest interuption to aid flights was a further blow to the relief operation to supply the city, where food stocks were "extremely low."

UN: B-H Army, Serb Forces Fighting in Bihac

AU0909134594 Paris AFP in English 1324 GMT 9 Sep 94

[Text] Zagreb, Sept 9 (AFP)—A woman was killed and four people badly injured by rocket fire on Friday in the northwestern Bosnian enclave of Bihac, where Serb forces are clashing with Bosnian government forces, a UN spokesman said.

Paul Risley, a spokesman for the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), said the casualties occurred when three 276mm rockets explosed in the centre of Velika Kladusa, in the northern part of Bihac.

Serbs Renew Attack on Bihac Town Center

AU0809145294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 8 Sep 94

[Mirza Sadikovic report from the Bihac front]

[Excerpt] (?The Cazin) fascists are not ceasing their attacks on the defense lines of the Grmusko-Srbljanski plateau, Hasin Vrh, the Grabez segment of the front, and the Bosanska Krupa and Buzim segments of the front. The Chetniks continue attempts to avenge the defeats inflicted by members of the [Bosnia-Herzegovina Army] 5th Corps by shelling residential areas in Bihac, Cazin, the free part of the Bosanska Krupa municipality, and wider areas of Buzim. At around (?noon) they again shelled the Bihac town center. Martic's Chetniks continue to bring in reinforcements and to entrench themselves in the Kladusa area. There are also sporadic artillery provocations along the defense lines, particularly in the outskirts of Kladusa, the area around [name indistinct]. [passage omitted]

Muslims Attack Serbian Positions Near Bihac

LD0809185694 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 8 Sep 94

[Text] In overnight infantry battles on the [Bosanska] Krupa and (?Novigrad) fronts, one Serb soldier was lightly injured. On the Muslim side, 15 fighters were killed and 68 were seriously or lightly injured. Heavy losses in the ranks of the Muslim army were also confirmed by Muslim radio in Bihac. In addition to artillery and infantry weapons, Muslims also used poisonous gases in their attacks on the wide area around Otoka, 15 km west of Krupa on the river Una.

Serbs Agree To Inspection of 'Labor Camps'

AU0809131294 Paris AFP in English 1251 GMT 8 Sep 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Sept 8 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs have agreed to allow Red Cross officials into forced labour camps in northeastern Bosnia where aid agencies report a resumption of ethnic cleansing, an ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] spokeswoman said Thursday [8 September].

"Finally the BSA (Bosnian Serb Army) has agreed to grant our delegates access to the forced labour camps in Lopare," said Lisa Jones of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

"We are hopeful that after numerous interventions we will be able to carry out these visits in the coming days."

The agreement allowed visits to camps in the area but a date has yet to be fixed for the inspections, said Jones, adding that the ICRC did not know how many camps the Serbs were running in the area nor how many they held.

However, the organisation had a list of some 150 names of people being held.

Camp workers are forced to carry out a number of tasks, including cutting down trees, working in the fields and digging trenches on frontline positions—a breach of the Geneva Convention.

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The move follows an increase in ethnic cleansing by Serb forces in the nearby Bijeljina area of northeastern Bosnia, from where more than 2,000 have been forced to leave since mid July.

Jones reported a further 183 people—mainly women, children and elderly—had been forced out of their homes in the nearby town of Janja on Monday in a two-day operation.

They were then forced to walk across the confrontation line between the Serb and the mainly-Moslem Bosnian army between Toromanovic and Djokici.

The expulsions in the Bijeljina are organised by Major Vojkan Djurkovic, the notorious Bosnian Serb army officer in charge of the so-called local exchange office which has been branded "little more than (a) racket" by Peter Kessler, spokesman for the UH High Commissioner for Refugees.

Ganic, de Mello Discuss Return of Refugees

AU0809203894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 8 Sep 94

[Text] Presidency member and Vice President of the Federation Ejup Ganic today received Sergio de Mello, head of the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] civilian sector in former Yugoslavia, and head of the UNPROFOR civilian sector in Bosnia-Herzegovina Victor Andreyev. Hasan Muratovic, chairman of the State Commission for Relations with the United Nations, also attended the meeting.

The talks focused on the problems of refugees from the Bosnian Krajina and their return home, as well as the ongoing genocide in Bijeljina, Banja Luka, and Janja. Also discussed was the escalation of the aggressor's military activity within the Sarajevo exclusion zone and the intensifying attacks on Bihac.

Dr. Ganic expressed his gratitude to Sergio de Mello for the efforts invested so far in the return of refugees to Velika Kladusa. The future meeting with United Nations special envoy former Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi was also set. The meeting is scheduled to take place after his visit to Banja Luka and Bijeljina.

Hundreds of Bosniaks Expelled From Janja

AU0909104994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 9 Sep 94

[Report by Salih Brkic]

[Text] Last night, further 598 persons expelled from Janja arrived in Tuzla over Mount Majevica pass. Among them were also two families from Bijeljina. They were rounded up from their homes in Bijeljina by the Chetniks of criminal Vojkan Djurkovic at about the same time the poor people from Janja were being transported to Priboj and Tuzla.

This marks the continuation of the tragic exodus of the Bosniaks from Semberia. Including the group that arrived last night, a total of 3,380 Bosniaks expelled from Bijeljina and Janja have so far arrived in Tuzla. Their statements confirm that the terror and ethnic cleansing have reached the culmination point. By handing over their homes and land, all of them had to pay 200 German marks for the ticket for their expulsion. This time (?criminal) Vojkan Djurkovic again singled out a fairly large group of men capable of working, about 70 of them, and the Chetniks then took them to the camp in Lopare. Prior to that, he took 1,500 German marks for each one of them.

The golgotha of the Bosniaks from Janja on Mount Majevica last night did not pass quietly, because the Chetnik Falangists suddenly opened fire in the area through which they were moving. Fortunately, no one was hurt. Among the expelled, the last ones of whom arrived in Tuzla at 0130 last night, there are several seriously ill and disabled persons. According to unconfirmed reports, one woman died on the way to Tuzla.

Muslim Leader Urges Butrus-Ghali's Resignation

BR0809124594 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 8 Sep 94 p 11

[Interview with Mustafa Efendija Ceric, head of Islamic community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, by "L.An." in Sarajevo; date not given: "Islamic Leader Says: It Is the Pagans' Fault; Butrus-Ghali Must Resign"]

[Excerpts] Sarajevo—The most senior religious authority of the Muslims of Sarajevo is demanding the resignation of UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali, who he considers bears the main blame for the cancellation of the pope's visit. Of course, a religious authority has no legal power to demand such a resignation, but his voice at least carries the force of a moral indictment. And his indictment is not diluted at present by any diplomatic circumlocutions. Mustafa Efendija Ceric, "reis ul-Ulema" of Sarajevo, said: "That would be the most honest gesture that Butrus-Ghali could make at present." [passage omitted]

[CORRIERE DELLA SERA] Who is to blame for the cancellation of the pope's visit?

[Ceric] For one thing, I believe that it is only a postponement, not a cancellation. In any case, we in Bosnia are no longer surprised by anything. The destruction of the Bosnians is the work of Butrus-Ghali and of the gentlemen that control the United Nations. This is why we are demanding the resignation of Butrus-Ghali, who has yet again proved himself to be a man who is easily intimidated and who does not want to represent everyone. The cancellation of the visit is the result of the clash between Lord Owen, the Serbs, and the United Nations, on the one hand, and all men who have feelings on the other.

[CORRIERE DELLA SERA] Nevertheless there is also cause to wonder why the pope did not put pressure on this front that you mentioned.

[Ceric] In any case, it is important that the pope decided on this visit. His visit would have constituted a great message to the world, but the cancellation of his visit sends an equally strong message about the way things are

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in the so-called new world order. It shows, as does Bosnia too, who holds the powers that now lead the world.

[CORRIERE DELLA SERA] Who are these powers?

[Ceric] Look at your own country. Consider Cairo, for instance. There are pagan forces that are seeking to destroy human life, legalizing the end of the family, homosexuality; and then there is indeed AIDS, which is God's way of reminding the Earth that there is a life of its own. In my humble opinion, however, Sarajevo could be the place where a real unity of believers is born, standing above all differences of creed, as the pope's visit was intended to assert.

[CORRIERE DELLA SERA] Muslims are very disappointed about the cancellation of the visit. Will this provide an opportunity for a relaxation of relations between the two religions? Or for a religious radicalization among the Muslims?

[Ceric] Some people will say now: See, it was all a sham, all hypocrisy. But the fact is that the pope too was a victim of the same powers that oppress us, and in this sense he is now even more one of us.

Biographic Data on Biljana Plavsic Published

94BA0395C Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 15 Aug 94 p 11

[Article by Dejan Anastasijevic: "Character and Deeds: Biljana Plavsic, Deputy Prime Minister of the Srpska Republic"]

[Text] **Date of birth and birthplace**: 1930, Tuzla.

Education and prewar career: Grew up in Sarajevo in the family of a doctor of biological science. Graduated from Zagreb University, where she majored in biology. After returning to Sarajevo, she began an academic career at the School of Natural Sciences and Mathematics of Sarajevo University, where she finally became dean. Was never a member of the League of Communists, which today she often emphasizes with pride, but she is silent about having been a member of the top leadership of the republic conference of the Socialist Alliance of Working People [SAWP].

How she got into politics: At the recommendation of one of her girlfriends ("If you think they would accept a woman"). Nikola Koljevic invited her into the leadership of the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party]. After the 1990 elections, she became a member of the B-H [Bosnia-Herzegovina] Collective Presidency and president of the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order of B-H. On 9 April 1992, together with Koljevic, she submited her resignation and transferred into the Presidency of the Srpska republic.

How she left Sarajevo: As the last member of the top Serbian leadership, on 20 May 1992, after Serbian fighters halted a convoy of Muslim children at Ilidza on her order and kept them as hostages until Mrs. Plavsic and family reached Pale safely.

Political credo: "Do not lie down, nor even kneel, because anyone who kneels will also lie down."

Nicknames: The fighting men, whom she often visits on the front lines, call her "Empress Biljana"; at least one little cafe (in Zvornik) and several armored vehicles have been named in her honor. Those who are less well-disposed toward her call her "Princess" because of the close company she keeps with Prince Tomislav.

What she is known for: For open advocacy of ethnic cleansing, which she says is a "quite natural phenomenon"; for the statement that as far as she is concerned "six million Serbs can die so that the other six million can live in freedom"; for the passionate kisses she showered upon Zeljko "Arkan" Raznatovic following "liberation" of Bijeljina in late March 1992; and for refusing to shake the hand of Milosevic during his visit to the Assembly in Pale in April of last year.

What she thinks about Slobodan Milosevic: That he should come before the Serbian people and publicly renounce communism, and then beg the forgiveness (of the people) and promise that he will never again introduce communism among the Serbs; that at one time he did a great deal for the Serbs, but he did not meet their expectations, that he is naive because he thinks that the world is going to remove the sanctions because he has blockaded the Srpska republic.

Where Milosevic would most like to put her: In the madhouse as a mental case.

What she thinks about Mirjana Markovic...: That she is evil and hungry for power, inclined to manipulation, intrigues, and lies.

...and Mirjana Markovic thinks about her: That she is inclined to waste her own people, that she is not well and is reminiscent of Dr. Jozef Mengele, who experimented with the endurance of certain nationalities in a similar way.

What Radovan Karadzic thinks about her...: He does not like her because she said in certain circles that Karadzic was not the legitimately elected president, because he was elected by the Assembly on Pale, while she, Biljana, was elected by the people in a prewar referendum. Aside from that, she has frequently criticized many of his close collaborators and openly supported the Banja Luka rebels in the September 1993 operation.

...and what Ratko Mladic thinks about her: He does not have too many reasons to like her either, because in a recent interview she expressed cautious suspicion that the general is under a certain influence of the League of Communists—Movement for Yugoslavia, although on the same occasion she praised his "organic patriotism."

So, Dr. Plavsic has problems: Does she ever. Unless the Srpska republic becomes a monarchy in short order, there is every prospect that her political rating will continue to fall to the level of Mirko Jovic, Dragos Kalajic, and similar peripheral figures who are alone in still having a favorable opinion of her.

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Deputy Prime Minister Seks Announces Resignation

LD0809131594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1250 GMT 8 Sep 94

[Excerpts] Zagreb, 8 Sep (TANJUG)—Croatian Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Seks has announced that he will resign from his office.

In his explanation, published today in the Zagreb VECERNJI LIST, Seks says that "he is taking up a new post in the Croatian Assembly."

As deputy prime minister, he was in charge of internal policy. [passage omitted]

Seeing that Seks' resignation follows that of Branimir Glavas in Osijek, observers believe that despite denials the resignations are the result of internal party conflicts within the ruling Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ].

Seks and Glavas belong to the same hardline rightist faction in the ruling party.

Tudjman Releases Prisoners for Pope's Visit

LD0909115094 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 9 Sep 94

[Text] On the occasion of the pope's visit to Croatia and at the request of the office for amnesties, President of Croatia Franjo Tudjman has decided to pardon a number of prisoners. Under this decision, 29 people have had their prison sentences rescinded, 41 people have been given suspended sentences, and 18 people have had their prison sentences reduced.

Fifty requests for pardon were rejected, the office of the President of Croatia announced.

UNPROFOR: Army Violating Cease-Fire Pact

LD0809164394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1545 GMT 8 Sep 94

[Text] Knin, Sept. 8—The United Nations Protection Force said Thursday that the Croatian army was violating the ceasefire agreement between Croatia and Krajina.

Alun Roberts, the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] spokesman for the region around the town of Knin in Serb Krajina, said Croatian troops had violated the ceasefire agreement and had restricted the movement of peacekeeping troops and UN military obervers.

Roberts said the worst violation occurred when Croatian troops intruded 200 meters into Serb Krajina territory near the town of Lipik in the Pakra river valley about 100 Km southeast of Zagreb. He said the Croats tried to entrap Serb forces by moving a checkpoint.

Roberts said the UNPROFOR commander of the area ordered the checkpoint removed and promised the Serbs that checkpoints would not be moved without the consent of UNPROFOR.

Roberts also said UNPROFOR had demaded an explanation from Croatia over an allegation that UN peacekeepers had helped ethnically cleanse Croats out of Serb Krajina.

Roberts said UNPROFOR officials continued to be concerned about the proximity of opposing forces along the lines of separation between Croatia and Serb Krajina.

Turning to the issue of the Muslim refugees from northwest Bosnia stranded in Serb Krajina, Roberts rejected estimates that there were 60,000 refugees in the area, saying UNPROFOR and UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] believed there were only about 33,000 Muslim refugees.

He said international relief agencies and UNPROFOR were helping the Muslim refugees and said the government of Krajina had provided a substantial amount of relief aid.

The Muslim refugees fled Bosnia to Serb Krajina last month after the Bosnian Muslim government army crushed the autonomous province of West Bosnia set up by moderate Muslims in northwestern Bosnia.

Highway Reopening Contingent on Refugees' Return

AU0709170794 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Report by Danko Peric from Knin]

[Text] This morning, David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, cochairmen of the Peace Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, met in Knin with the republic of Serbian Krajina state leadership. According to what republic of Serbian Krajina president Milan Martic told journalists, the Krajina's condition for opening the Belgrade-Zagreb section of the highway—which partly runs through the Republic of Serbian Krajina territory—is the return of Serbs to the villages in western Slavonia from which they were expelled and international guarantees for their safety and the safety of the territory. The extension of the UN Protection Force's [UNPROFOR] mandate was also discussed, as was the resumption of the Krajina-Croatia negotiations on economic issues. The Krajina side again particularly insisted on the abolishment of Point 12 of UN Security Council Resolution 820 that obstructs import and export activities, which is incompatible with the Vance plan.

Plight of Muslim Refugees From West Bosnia

LD0709191194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1236 GMT 7 Sep 94

[By Sava Jankovic]

[Text] Turanj, Sept. 7 (TANJUG)—Muslim refugees from the autonomous province of west Bosnia who have fled to the republic of Serb Krajina are very angry at the conduct of international relief agencies.

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The refugees, most of them sympathizers of exiled west Bosnia president Fikret Abdic, complain that international relief agencies deal with political rather than humanitarian issues.

Abdic declared autonomy in part of the northwestern Bosnian enclave of Bihac in September 1993 in response to the Bosnian Muslim government's policy of continuing the civil war.

Mehmed Latic of the West Bosnia Refugee Committee says that the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees provides only a quarter-loaf of bread per person each day. He also says that that there is not enough water and clothing.

'Although the organization in refugee camps is satisfactory, the shortage of food, especially for children, clothing and water threaten with an epidemic,' says Latic.

Confirming Latic's statement, Mile Bosnic of Serb Krajipa's refugee relief organization says that international relief agencies are deliberately trying to convince the international public that the number of refugees is much smaller than it actually is.

Serb Krajina does not have sufficient resources to support about 55,000 refugees camping along the roads leading to Croatia who are hoping to be granted entry into Croatia.

The refugees say they want to reach destinations in western Europe via Croatia, but Croatian authorities deny them entry.

Croatian special police and army forces deployed along the border have been given orders to open fire if the refugees attempt to cross the border.

Serb Krajina health officials say ten refugee children and several old people and women have died becuase of severe shortages of medicine and inadequate medical care.

The Serb Krajina refugee organization has an additional problem with the accomodation and treatment of the sick and wounded Muslims released from hospitals in Karlovac and Zagreb in Croatia.

'About 20 wounded men arrived with discharge certificates saying they are on their way to recovery, although all of them have sustained severe injuries which cannot be treated in refugee camps and the Serb hospitals in Glina and Vojnic are already overcrowded,' says Latic.

He also says the wounded Muslims have told him that the remaining 100 wounded followers of Abdic will also be discharged from Croatian hospitals in the near future.

The Muslim refugees all say the Serbs have done their best to help them.

About 33,000 refugees in the town of Batnoga say the Serbs share the little food they have with the refugees.

The refugees are accomodated in the former fowl farm and in improvised nylon tents, but international relief agencies and the western press are ignoring their plight.

Outside Aid Required To Absorb Bosnian Refugees

LD0909082894 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English 0803 GMT 9 Sep 94

[Text] The head of the government office for refugees and displaced persons, Adalbert Rebic, has said that Croatia cannot accept any more refugees from Bosnia without the help of other countries. Speaking at a meeting with representatives of some 50 Croatian and foreign humanitarian organizations, he mentioned that Croatia was spending 32 million marks per month on caring for refugees and displaced persons. He added that the biggest problem was now a shortage of food and asked the organizations to increase their food aid.

RSK Leader on Scheduled Talks With Zagreb

LD0809181894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1746 GMT 8 Sep 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Knin, Sept. 8 (TANJUG)—The water supply and re-opening of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway will be discussed at a new round of talks with Croatia, Serb Krajina prime minister Borislav Mikelic has said.

In an interview to TANJUG Thursday, Mikelic said that the priority list for the forthcoming talks had been made during his meeting with Croatian representatives Hrvoje Sarinic and Ivic Pasalic in Knin in early August.

Mikelic heads the Serb Krajina negotiating team for the talks with Croatia.

The talks are being carefully prepared through the mediation of the Conference on Former Yugoslavia, said Mikelic.

If the talks result in agreement, the Croatian cities of Sisak, Zadar and Biograd, will get water, and, reciprocally, the towns of Drnis and Teslingrad in Serb Krajina, Mikelic said.

The Croatian Government demands that the Zagreb-Belgrade highway, which partly runs through the territory of Serb Krajina, should be re-opened for traffic up to the Croatian town of Slavonski Brod, about 200 km southeast of Zagreb, said Mikelic.

The Serb Krajina government, however, demands the re-opening of the highway in its entire length, thus providing a link between Serb Krajina and Belgrade, he said.

The Serb Krajina delegation will propose to the Croatian Government to allow Serb refugees to return to some of the 185 Serb villages in western Slavonia which are currently uninhabited, Mikelic said, explaining that Croats had carried out ethnic cleansing there.

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We propose the villages be proclaimed safe areas and get protection from the United Nations, said Mikelic.

Mikelic said he hoped the Croatian Government would accept this proposal if they considered the opening of the highway as an important issue.

The international community should take over responsibility for convincing the Croatian Government to accept this approach in dealing with economic issues, particularly the re-opening of the highway, he said.

However, an obstacle in realising economic issues would be Article 12 of the United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 820 on imposing sanctions on the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro, said Mikelic.

A considerable time was devoted to this problem at the talks held in Knin on Wednesday between senior government officials of Serb Krajina and Yugoslavia Conference Co-chairmen David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, he said.

Owen told reporters that Resolution No. 820 and other relevant resolutions would be discussed in New York next week. Owen believes that resolution No. 820 does not cover the U.N Protected Area [UNPA]. He said it does not contain any limitations as to direct export-import activities by the Krajina Serbs of the UNPA, Mikelic said.

Commenting on the possibility of observers being placed at the border with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mikelic said that the Serb Krajina government "refused such a proposal for the obvious reason that the whole of Serb Krajina territory is covered by U.N. troops."

When the economy gradually begins to operate and goods again begin to circulate on re-opened traffic routes, "progress will soon be evident and Croatia's desire to attack Serbs or get Krajina at all costs will gradually die," Mikelic said.

"Our intention is to show the Croatian side and the world, at the forthcoming talks, that we are determined to resolve all outstanding issues in a peaceful way," said Mikelic.

RSK Official on Army, Defense Potential

LD0809191894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1737 GMT 8 Sep 94

[Excerpt] Knin, 8 Sep (TANJUG)—In connection with a tragic incident that took place in the village of Bojna in the Banija region, the government of the Republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] at its session today discussed defense potential and the situation in the Serb Krajina army, and called for the objective and analytical examination of the defense potential along the entire RSK border.

According to a statement from the session, the government also demanded that urgent discussion be held between municipal authorities and army commands to secure the firmer defense of the state borders. [passage omitted]

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Parliament President Announces Election Date

AU0709210594 Paris AFP in English 2043 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Text] Skopje, Sept 7 (AFP)—Macedonian Parliament President Stojan Andov announced Wednesday presidential and legislative elections for October 16, bringing the date forward a month.

Initially set for November 16, Andov announced the date at a reception honouring the third anniversary of the independence of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Legislation in the Macedonian Parliament, where no party holds a majority of the 120 seats, has been blocked due to disagreements over the adoption of major legislation.

ΩNewspapers Examine Unemployment, Labor Problems

94P21137A

[Editorial Report] During the summer months, newspapers in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) published articles containing data on unemployment and reporting on labor problems.

Defense Ministry Enterprise Payroll Difficulties

The Skopje daily NOVA MAKEDONIJA of 14 June published a short article describing complaints voiced at a "protest meeting" by 470 employees of the "Vardar" Military Institute, which operates concessions for the Defense Ministry. The impetus for the gathering was the Defense Ministry's intention to separate the institute from the Defense Ministry, giving it civilian status and forcing it to compete with private and state-owned enterprises for military contracts, according to NOVA MAKEDONIJA. Workers who operate canteens, recreation facilities, and concession stores on military posts believe that they will lose their jobs. Vardar "trade unionists" state that the company is facing internal financial difficulties and has not paid its workers for four months. According to NOVA MAKEDONIJA, unionists blame the institute director for the financial difficulties and will ask the defense minister to replace him.

Breakdown of Unemployment by Cities

In a 21 July report NOVA MAKEDONIJA placed total unemployment in FYROM at 145,996 and provided the following figures on unemployment in larger cities: Skopje—46,962; Kumanovo—16,837; Prilep—11,629; Bitola—10,714; Sveti Nikole—8,395; Titov Veles—7,950; Gostivar—7,426; Kocani—6,588; and Makedoniski Brod—1,146.

Salary Levels, Declining Ability To Meet Payrolls

On 27 July NOVA MAKEDONIJA published figures on salaries apparently earned in May but paid or reported in July. The average salary was 7,807 denars, but more than 15 percent of the workers had not received their wages for a month or more.

Increasing Unemployment in Kumanovo

Only five workers found jobs in Kumanovo during the past four months, according to a report in the 28 July issue of VECER. Of 18,000 unemployed workers, 357 had completed university-level education, 364 were high school graduates, and more than 3,000 had finished middle school. VECER also reported that the high unemployment is placing a strain on social services and that many opstina (township) organizations are considering strikes.

Declining Production, Increasing Unemployment in Titov Veles

In a 28 July survey of economic conditions in Titov Veles, VECER reported that, because of the international sanctions against Serbia, a major customer, and the embargo imposed on FYROM by Greece, at the local ceramics factory production of household porcelain products had dropped 60 percent and that of wall tiles 30 percent over the past three years, forcing layoffs and wage reductions. At the "Brako" metallurgical plant, workers had been on strike for "a few" months. Only 150 employees of a total of about 800 were still working there. According to VECER reporter Lj. Ivcev, people expected that there would be 8,000 to 13,000 unemployed workers in Titov Veles as prospects for other industries declined.

Statistical Institute Figures on Cost of Living

According to a report published in VECER of 6-7 August, retail prices fell 0.6 percent in July because of lower prices for vegetables (35.9 percent decline) and fruits (4.3 percent decline) compared with prices the previous month. When compared to prices for the same month in 1993, however, July 1994 prices showed an increase of 133.6 percent, and they were 41.3 percent higher than prices in December 1993. Industrial production declined 13.2 percent compared to the same time last year. During the past six months, exports totaled $501 million, a 3.6-percent increase over the same period in 1993, and imports reached $666 million, a 25-percent increase. Prices of industrial products increased 119 percent, retail prices 175.6 percent, costs of services 208.4 percent; the overall cost of living was up 188.8 percent. The average salary paid during January-May 1994 period was 7,327 denars, 196 percent higher than during the same period last year. In comparision with the December 1993 figure, however, this represents an increase of only 16 percent. Real income for the January-May 1994 period was only 5.3 percent higher than that for the same period in 1993, and it declined 10.2 percent compared to December 1993.

More Families Requiring Social Assistance

The number of families receiving assistance from the state reached 46,804 in May, compared to 43,787 in April, according to a report in the 15 August issue of VECER. In May, the state spent about 131 million denars to help such families. VECER noted that the

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Ministry of Labor and Social Policy has approved setting the level for social assistance every three months—for example, the period July-September. During this period, each member of a worker's or pensioner's household (consisting of up to five persons) would be entitled to 1,800 denars, while members of agricultural households,the unemployed, and the "socially disadvantaged" could receive more than 1,800 denars. In practice, however, the state will not pay these amounts, VECER stated, since it will take into account recipients' other sources of income.

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Federal

UNHCR Welcomes Belgrade's 'Peaceful Policy'

LD0809204694 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2014 GMT 8 Sep 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, Sept. 8 (TANJUG)—United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees representative in Belgrade Charles Henry Bazoche on Thursday welcomed Yugoslavia's peaceful policy on behalf of High Commissioner Sadako Ogata, the Yugoslav Information Ministry said.

Bazoche is quoted as making the statement in a talk with Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Zeljko Simic, the ministry said in a statement.

The statement quotes Simic as saying that recent activities of the Yugoslav Government for settling the Bosnian civil war were another proof of its consistent policy of peace.

They proved the commitment of the Yugoslav Government and key political figures to dealing with the crisis in the region through diplomatic talks and by political means, Simic said.

Bazoche said his work in Yugoslavia had convinced him that the country and all its bodies were making an invaluable contribution to solving all humanitarian questions.

The statement quotes him as saying that special efforts are being made to accommodate the more than 500,000 refugees of different ethnic and religious background who have found shelter in the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro.

Bazoche said the international community had obviously changed its attitude to Yugoslavia, whose reincorporation in the world community was inevitable.

Simic Views Latest Contact Group Results

AU0809194894 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 8 Sep 94

["Excerpt" from a statement by Zeljko Simic, FRY deputy prime minister, given to Novi Sad Radio; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] The results of the latest Contact Group meeting are more than encouraging, especially because they announce measures that are extremely favorable for the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. They represent the best confirmation of FRY's consistent peace-loving and peace-promoting policy regarding the civil war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and all the crisis hot spots throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

The decision of which I speak and which I call extremely encouraging should not come as a surprise to anyone. It truly represents the apex of a consistent foreign affairs policy that Yugoslavia, if I may say so, has been pursuing from the very beginning of this terrible crisis on the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. This policy, if I my say so, has culminated in this decision, which was effectively unavoidable because the international community or individual influential countries could simply no longer turn a blind eye to obvious facts and proofs regarding the policy that has to a great degree contributed to the abatement of great tensions on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and, in the final instance, managed to prevent the escalation of clashes throughout the Balkan peninsula.

Therefore, this decision by no means comes as a surprise. In a way it endorses our foreign affairs policy, the correctness of the decisions that we have made in the last few weeks concerning the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, and especially the present Bosnian Serb leadership's policy. It is more than evident that a great discrepancy, or better to say, misunderstanding of the international situation, its general climate, and the entire issue has emerged on the part of the Bosnian Serb leadership. It is not in touch with the political and actual reality even though it should be, for the sake of the people it leads.

SRS Calls For No-Confidence Vote in Government

LD0809145394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1327 GMT 8 Sep 94

[Text] Belgrade, 8 Sep (TANJUG)—Serbian Radical Party [SRS] Chairman Vojislav Seselj said today that the SRS Club of Deputies in the Chamber of Citizens of the Federal Yugoslav Assembly has submitted a request for a vote of no confidence in the Federal Government.

Seselj stressed at a news conference that, since the federal parliament's code of practice has been changed, the request must be put on the agenda within 15 days of its submission.

He explained that the cause for the request is the suspension of political and economic ties between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and the Srpska republic, whereby, the SRS believes, "the vital interests of the Serbian nation are threatened."

The SRS leader stressed that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic "opened the election campaign of the Socialist Party of Serbia" with his speech in Vranje yesterday.

Seselj claims that the Socialists "are planning to call federal elections within the next several months," and that the Serbian Radicals "have nothing against it" because they believe that "elections at all levels are necessary."

In his opinion, it is realistic to expect that after the elections the SRS would lose some seats in the federal

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parliament. However, he believes that the party needs the elections because they would mobilize all its potentials and strengthen it.

Commenting on the meeting of the Contact Group for Bosnia in Berlin, Seselj stressed that there is no official statement from the meeting, and added that "it is futile to expect the sanctions to be lifted."

He believes that the possible opening of Belgrade's Surcin Airport and the lifting of the blockade on culture and sport "would not change anything in the FRY's economy."

He noted that the SRS is in favor of establishing confederal ties between the FRY and the Srpska republic "as the first step toward setting up a united state of the Serbian nation."

Kosovo

Rugova: Albanians Willing To Talk to Milosevic

LD0909114794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1051 GMT 9 Sep 94

[Text] Pristina, 9 Sepr (TANJUG)—Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo [DSK], has said in an interview to the Pristina-based weekly ZERI that the Albanians will accept talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic or other representatives of the Serbian authorities.

It is important to start talks and consider how to conduct them, Rugova said and stressed that "after all, all international powers talk to Milosevic."

The DSK leader says that the Albanians are not attaching any conditions to the talks. He claims that the presence of "a third party" is not a condition for starting dialogue but "something normal."

It is the DSK's view that Serbian-Albanian talks will not be successful without the presence of a third party to guarantee implementation of an agreement, Rugova said and added that there are initiatives on the part of Russia and Switzerland regarding possibilities of starting a dialogue.

Rugova stated that talks without, as he says, the presence of a third party would legitimize the insistence of the Serbian authorities and the opposition on presenting Kosovo as an internal affair of Serbia. He reiterated his old theory that "this is not the case" and that Kosovo allegedly has its own identity.

It is significant that for the first time there is no mention of the word "negotiations" either in the questions asked by ZERI or in the answers of this prominent leader of the Kosovo Albanians. Until recently, this word was routinely used in Rugova's propaganda.

In his interview, as well as at today's press conference, Rugova said that the possibility "of Serbian-Albanian talks is only being discussed" as there is nothing official, but it is a good thing that they are being discussed.

Police Kill Woman in Decan; Situation 'Tense'

AU0809195794 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 8 Sep 94

[Text] At about 1330 today, the Serbian police in Decan killed 23-year-old Violeta Kastrati Dervishaj, mother of two children. Violeta was wounded on the balcony of her house and died on the way to Peje hospital.

The Kosova Information Center reports that today the Serbian police launched another large-scale raid in Decan, as it was a market day. There are suspicions that others may have been wounded from the numerous fire shots. Many citizens were mistreated and arrested.

The city of Decan was blocked off by the police this afternoon, and electric current and telephone lines were cut off.

In the aftermath to this police raid, the Kosova Democratic Alliance branch assesses the situation to be extremely tense and has called on citizens to avoid provocations.

Police Report 'Attack'

LD0909104694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1024 GMT 9 Sep 94

[Text] Pristina, 9 Sep (TANJUG)—At midday yesterday there was an attack on a police patrol in Decani by several citizens of Albanian nationality and firearms were used by both sides.

One person was killed according to confirmation TANJUG's correspondent has received from the investigative court authorities in Pec.

According to the initial findings of judge Slobodan Nikolic, who is leading the investigation, the incident occurred when the police patrol asked to see the identity cards of Baskim Salja (20), Haljilj Salja (21), and Zumber Gasi (21).

Baskim Salja tried to seize the gun of one of the policemen. The three were restrained, but other citizens of Albanian nationality at the scene joined in and firearms were used by both sides.

Twenty-four-year-old Violeta Dervisaj was injured by a stray bullet on the balcony of her house and died shortly afterwards. Two policemen were slightly injured.

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